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Letter from the Editors 
 The Gettysburg Historical Journal embodies the History 
Department's dedication to diverse learning and excellence in 
academics. Each year, the Journal publishes the top student work 
in a range of topics across the spectrum of academic disciplines 
with different methodological approaches to the study of history. 
In the words of Marc Bloch, author of The Historian's Craft, 
"history is neither watchmaking nor cabinet construction. It is an 
endeavor toward better understanding." In the spirit of this maxim, 
our authors strive to elucidate the many facets of human societies 
and cultures. Whether these young scholars' research is focused on 
politics, religion, economics, environmental history, or women, 
gender, and sexuality studies, and the editorial staff is consistently 
proud of the diverse subject matter we select for publication. 
 With the assistance of the Cupola, Gettysburg College's 
online research repository, and the distinguished college faculty, 
our authors' work has received both serious scholarly attention and 
national accolades. Past authors have also gone on to publish 
follow-up work in refereed journals, and to present their work at 
undergraduate and professional conferences. The Historical 
Journal is primarily a student-run organization, and as such, it 
provides undergraduate students with a unique opportunity to gain 
valuable experience reviewing, editing, and organizing academic 
articles for publication. In all cases, authors and editors have also 
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had the opportunity to apply these skills to their future careers, or 
to their work as graduate students. 
 This fifteenth edition of the Historical Journal continues 
the tradition of scholarly rigor of past volumes, while broadening 
both the diversity of historical perspectives and the methodologies 
employed by each author. Each of the following works selected for 
this edition exemplifies the varied interests of the History students 
at Gettysburg College. In her article, ""Where We May Oftener 
Converse Together": Translation of Written and Spoken 
Communication in Colonial Pennsylvania," Jenna Fleming 
examines the impact of language barriers and translation 
difficulties on the relationships between Native Americans and 
European colonists on the Pennsylvania frontier.  
 Ryan M. Nadeau's article "Creating a Statesman: The Early 
Life of Prince Clemens von Metternich and its Effect on his 
Political Philosophy" sheds light on Prince Clemens von 
Metternich's formative years and how his early life shaped his 
Metternichian principles.  
 In "Virtus in the Roman World: Generality, Specificity, and 
Fluidity," Kyle Schrader explores the evolving definition of the 
Roman concept of virtus through the Roman Republic. He argues 
that, over time, the definition of virtus shifted from a concept with 
many loose definitions of morality and character to one that was 
exclusively used to define those who were successful. 
 In his article, "The Desperate Rebels of Shimabara: The 
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Economic and Political Persecutions and the Tradition of Peasant 
Revolt," Jake Farias examines the Shimabara Rebellion in 
Tokugawa Japan, building a narrative connection between 
Christian resistance to the Tokugawa government and the strife of 
Japan's impoverish peasants. Through his examination, he explores 
the causes of the rebellion and seeks to contextualize it among 
other rebellions of the era. 
 In ""Under the auspices of peace": The Northwest Indian 
War and its Impact on the Early American Republic," Melanie L. 
Fernandes analyzes the influence of the Northwest Indian War on 
early American policy, arguing that the conflict led to reforms 
which,  ultimately, strengthened the federal government's power. 
Collectively, these articles not only show the hard work and 
careful research of our student authors, but they also exemplify the 
diverse interests of our students and the many research 
opportunities available to them at Gettysburg College. 
 
The General Editors, 
 
Melanie L. Fernandes 
Ryan M. Nadeau 
Sophia D. Vayansky 
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"Where We May Oftener Converse Together": 
Translation of Written and Spoken 
Communication in Colonial Pennsylvania 
By 
Jenna Fleming 
~      ~ 
 
 During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
systems of communication between Europeans and Indians in 
North American remained in their formative stages. As members 
of both groups attempted to gauge each other’s motives, learn 
about cultural practices, and establish mutually beneficial 
relationships, they faced many obstacles to understanding. The 
most evident of these were differences in language, as the vastly 
inconsistent backgrounds and structures of European and Indian 
languages made basic communication difficult for the earliest 
interpreters. In addition to problems of language learning, 
translation, and contextual usage that accompanied spoken 
conversation, written forms of dialogue presented other equally 
formidable challenges to the peoples of early colonial America. 
The unique environment of Pennsylvania, established under and 
governed by Quaker religious ideals, presented a setting in which 
interactions between Indians and Europeans evolved differently 
than in other colonies. From William Penn’s founding of the 
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colony and first contact with the area’s Indians in 1682, 
negotiation rather than dominance was instituted as precedent in 
native relations. 1  While both sides consistently touted aims of 
peaceful coexistence and enthusiastic cooperation, attainment of 
these goals was often incomplete at best. 
 From its seat at Philadelphia, the Pennsylvanian 
government continually attempted to extend its influence and 
territorial claims outward. Contact, conflict, and the need for 
cooperation with different Indian groups posed major challenges in 
communication, too great for the legislature to handle. Likewise, 
Indian peoples faced similar difficulties in regard to tribal 
affiliation, land ownership, and the development of trade with 
colonial societies. In these situations, specialized representatives 
acted as messengers, translators, interpreters, negotiators, or in any 
combination of these roles.2 Individuals had an important position 
within the greater narrative of relations between colonists and 
Indians, whether they were professionals sponsored by officials or 
happened upon their duties by chance. English or native, each 
possessed a singular experience, skill set, and personal views and 
helped to simultaneously complicate and ease the delicate process 
of communication between and within their societies. 
 On every level, perceptions of language played a major part 
                                                          
1 James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 61.  
2 Ibid., 56.  
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in creating the general structure and course of negotiations in 
colonial Pennsylvania. Personal prejudices, conversational 
misunderstandings, deft omissions, honest mistakes, and willful 
mistranslations all functioned as manipulations of language, which 
intentional or not, had an impact on the people who experienced 
them. The importance of language is evidenced in a multitude of 
instances. In 1750, Conrad Weiser’s companion Christian Daniel 
Claus, unable to understand an Indian religious ritual and trusting 
his own assumptions, made an inaccurate record of the ceremony 
in his travel journal.3 Though this failure in communication could 
have proved harmful only to Claus within the context of his 
education about Indian negotiations, if passed on to others the 
misunderstanding could have had more widespread negative 
effects.  
 The study of communication in colonial Pennsylvania is 
complicated by two factors: translation and availability of primary 
sources. Residents of the colony came from a wide variety of 
backgrounds and spoke many different languages of European and 
North American origin. Though many prominent negotiators and 
even some regular citizens had experience in two or more 
languages, levels of proficiency varied and the lack of standardized 
forms complicated the situation. While different Indian groups 
                                                          
3 Christian Daniel Claus, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad 
Weiser: A Journey to Onondaga, 1750, trans. and ed. Helga Doblin and William 
A. Starna (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1994), 47.  
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were connected by language stocks, many dialects existed, each 
with their own particularities. The transfer of Indian languages, 
which did not have a written form prior to European contact, from 
spoken word to paper, served as another form of translation.  
 Though it presented a significant contemporary challenge, 
translation is still an issue for historians of the era, as they attempt 
to work with sources written in languages they may not be familiar 
with or in a mixture of dialects. In any context, a translated piece is 
a step away from the original, and in an historical sense the 
relationship between the two can be even more intricate. The 
translations recorded for present-day use were made at different 
times – some by primary recorders and others years later – and in 
different circumstances, some rushed and haphazard, others 
methodical and purposeful. The historian’s task is to recognize and 
consider these factors while evaluating a source for its content. 
 The general lack of primary written sources left by Indians 
creates a problem for almost any study of Native American history. 
The most complete records of Indian communications come from 
the colonial perspective, through official accounts of treaty 
negotiations and government councils or personal diaries. Any 
report of Indian words, documented by white colonists, includes 
supplementary descriptions and judgments of Indian behavior and 
conduct. Though these sources can be helpful in providing more 
information about colonial perceptions and relations between the 
two groups, it can also be challenging to proceed given the lack of 
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evidence from the Indian voice.   
 In spite of these challenges, there is a strong foundation of 
scholarship on the subject. Some authors have focused on the 
process of negotiation itself and the people who took part in it, 
considering their identities and functions within the structure of 
colonial government.4 Others study the importance of oratory and 
the ways in which it was regarded and utilized by both colonists 
and Indians.5 Studies of specific instances of communication, such 
as land purchases and trade agreements, also contribute to 
scholarship on the use of language in colonial America.6 As it was 
a widely influential and pervasive issue, information on 
communication can be found in many secondary sources on the 
early history of Pennsylvania.   
 The fragility and flexibility of language, revealed in a long 
and complex series of interactions, influenced the course of 
exchange in early Pennsylvania. Inhabitants of the colony during 
                                                          
4 Merrell, Into the American Woods; Margaret Connell Szasz, ed., Between 
Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1994). 
5 Sandra M. Gustafson, Eloquence is Power: Oratory and Performance in Early 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Nancy L. 
Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them’: The Interpreter as Cultural Broker 
during Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-70,” Ethnohistory 35, no. 1 (Winter 
1988), JSTOR. 
6 Colin G. Calloway, Pen & Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty Making in 
American Indian History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); James H. 
Merrrell, “‘I Desire All That I Have Said . . . May Be Taken down Aright’: 
Revisiting Teedyuscung's 1756 Treaty Council Speeches,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly 63, no. 4 (Oct., 2006), JSTOR. 
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the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had a wide 
variety of perspectives on language, its abilities, and its proper 
uses. A significant cultural gulf separated Indians and colonists, 
yet they remained connected through the vast number of 
opportunities for communication available to them. At their most 
fundamental level, these methods of interaction can be divided into 
two categories: nonverbal and verbal. The first encompasses such 
diverse themes as behavioral cues, vocal intonation, performance 
practices, and the creation, distribution, and interpretation of 
wampum — an especially prominent characteristic of contact 
between Indians and colonists, and one that functioned as both an 
asset and a challenge to those involved.7 These nonverbal forms of 
communication, while significant, represent a largely separate, 
distinct topic with its own background of research, scholarship, 
and implications. The second, verbal category of communication 
involves the use of the spoken and written word, allowing for a 
more concrete examination of the disparities and parallels between 
native and English cultures, languages, and constructions. Issues of 
translation, speech, and text revealed and in some cases caused 
points of contention between the two peoples of early 
Pennsylvania. Though colonists and Indians attempted to find 
common methods of communication, with varying degrees of 
success, differences added up, contributing to the difficulty of 
                                                          
7 Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them,’” 66. 
17 
 
maintaining positive relations between the two groups. 
 
 Colonial Pennsylvania was a region of mixed populations 
and identities: cultural, social, national, religious, and linguistic. 
Residents came from a variety of backgrounds and were divided 
along lines much more intricate than those which simply separated 
Indian and European peoples. Colonists came primarily from 
England, in a reflection of the colony’s founding heritage, but 
significant German and Scots-Irish populations were also present. 
The historical establishments of New Netherland and New Sweden 
accounted for a small but enduring populace of Northern European 
origins. 8  Each of these groups naturally possessed its own 
linguistic tradition, distinguished from European forms of language 
and influenced by North American interactions. Indian residents of 
the area experienced a similar diversity of languages. While most 
native Pennsylvanian languages were derived from one of two 
major language stocks, the Algonquian or Iroquois, the many 
differences between individual dialects meant that languages of the 
same stock could still be mutually incomprehensible. Even when 
conversing among themselves, Shawnees, Delawares, Piscataways, 
Nanticokes, and members of the Iroquois Confederacy would 
likely need translators.9 Language was, therefore, a concern that 
                                                          
8 Joseph E. Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania: A History (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 28. 
9 Merrell, Into the American Woods, 57.  
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residents of the region that became Pennsylvania had coped with 
long before the arrival of William Penn, or indeed any European 
colonist. By the time of England’s conquest of New Netherland in 
1664, the Dutch colonists and Delaware Indians in the area had 
already created the “Delaware Jargon,” a pidgin dialect of their 
respective languages used to further trade and diplomatic relations 
between officials of the two groups.10 From his arrival in North 
America in 1682 onwards, the colonial proprietor William Penn 
made an effort to establish clear and candid systems of 
communication with native residents. 11  For those who did not 
share in Penn’s benign goals or have access to his resources, 
translation proved an even greater challenge, placing a significant 
early demand on those who were proficient in languages.   
 The role and identity of the translator was a multifaceted 
and delicate concept, singular to each individual who took on the 
significant responsibility of mediating between cultures. This 
position, which James H. Merrell comprehensively examined in 
Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier, demanded a high level of linguistic and social skill, a 
great deal of commitment, and exceedingly good judgment, 
                                                          
10 William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter, eds., Friends and Enemies in 
Penn’s Woods: Indians, Colonists, and the Racial Construction of Pennsylvania 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 19.  
11 Articles of Agreement with the Susquehanna Indians (1701), in The Papers of 
William Penn, vol. 4., 1685-1700, ed. Marianne S. Wokeck et al. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), EBSCOhost eBook Collection, 51.  
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especially under pressure. Rarely could a person serve in the 
capacity of a translator alone; inherent differences between 
European and Indian languages meant that basic, literal translation 
between the two often produced an unsatisfactory result. 
Therefore, when moving between languages, translators were 
required to interpret messages, even on a rudimentary level. 12 
Interpretation was a more involved practice than translation, 
requiring an understanding not only of words’ definitions, but also 
their meanings, connotations, and implications.  
 The individuals responsible for interpretation consequently 
required a greater familiarity with their contemporary political and 
social environment than was possessed by the average citizen. 
Translators, whether of Indian or colonial origin, were frequently 
in close contact with their community leaders and kept well-
informed of relevant economic changes and military operations.13 
For most, travel was an innate part of their occupation, as they 
journeyed within and beyond the colony’s established borders to 
gather information, deliver messages, attend councils, and in some 
cases prevent misunderstandings that could lead to potential 
diplomatic disasters. Records of these journeys, such as Christian 
Frederick Post’s account of his 1758 trip from Philadelphia to the 
                                                          
12 Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them,’” 64. 
13 Nancy L. Hagedorn, “Faithful, Knowing, and Prudent’: Andrew Montour as 
Interpreter and Cultural Broker, 1740-1722,” in Between Indian and White 
Worlds: The Cultural Broker, ed. Margaret Connell Szasz (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press), 1994, 49. 
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Ohio River and Conrad Weiser’s report of his 1750 expedition to 
Onondaga, emphasize how often the translator or interpreter was 
called upon to act as a negotiator, whether or not that title had been 
part of his original job description. Often functioning as the sole 
speaker or the head of a small party representing his own 
government and society, the translator faced the difficult 
responsibility of creating a balance in communicating messages. 
While accuracy and truthfulness were crucial, professional 
messengers often took or were given license to edit, alter, and 
generally improvise in delivery, even and especially in cases of 
“delicate and inflammatory topics.”14 When dealing with replies 
from the opposite side and formulating their own responses, 
mediators were forced to make compromises and concessions, 
increasing their personal participation in the process and 
attempting to build their reputations as honest and dependable 
envoys. Those who worked directly with language translation 
found their roles and duties expanded as they were eventually 
identified, subliminally or explicitly, not only as translators but 
also as interpreters, messengers, negotiators, representatives, and 
diplomats.  
 In consideration of language and translation on the 
Pennsylvanian frontier, one must ask upon what occasions and in 
what areas specific languages were utilized for cross-cultural 
                                                          
14 James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods, 200.  
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communication. Government business, land and trade negotiations, 
military encounters, and more casual contact between civilians all 
represented very different situations in which a European 
language, an Indian language, some conglomeration of the two, or 
an entirely separate method might be chosen as the medium of 
interaction between two or more individuals. Geography might 
likewise have a part in determining linguistic habits, with native 
languages dominating in Indian-controlled or more rural areas and 
European languages taking precedence in more heavily-settled 
areas under colonial governance. 15  However, each interaction 
between Indians and colonists possessed its own unique character 
and qualities, making generalizations about language usage 
difficult to determine. The primary governing factor in exchange 
was the language abilities of those participating in a given 
conversation; this detail was clearly variable, making the 
particulars of any interaction dependent upon not only its social or 
geographical circumstances but also the individuals involved.   
 Record-keeping, or lack thereof, presents a similar 
challenge to an analysis of language use. Instances of unofficial or 
non-governmental relations between natives and colonists would 
frequently have gone unrecorded, if only due to the prevalence of 
low literacy rates. 16  Even in cases of military or economic 
negotiations, cross-cultural conversations and especially the details 
                                                          
15 Pencak and Richter, eds., Friends and Enemies, 108. 
16 Merrell, Into the American Woods, 194.  
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of such were largely seen as so mundane as not to merit 
documentation. Except in influential, extraordinary, or somehow 
otherwise important cases, exchanges between Indians and 
colonists were not remarked upon. This absence of documentation 
nevertheless provides some information regarding the popular 
attitude towards issues of language in colonial Pennsylvania. 
Difficulties in communication, attempts to find common 
languages, and employment of translators were so common as not 
to typically draw comment. These challenges, then, can be 
understood as facts of life for those living on both sides of the 
Pennsylvania frontier.    
 Even when documented, references to language are not 
always easily understood. In his 1758 diary recounting his 
diplomatic mission to the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo Indians 
at the Ohio River, Christian Frederick Post described interactions 
with individuals of many different cultural backgrounds, who 
presumably spoke a variety of languages. Post himself was fluent 
in or at least comfortable with several languages of European and 
Indian origin. However, he only occasionally made note of the 
languages he utilized to communicate with his friends, enemies, 
and counterparts. On August 10, about one month after his party 
set out from Bethlehem, Post recorded that “we met three 
Frenchmen, who appeared very shy of us, but said nothing more 
than to enquire, whether we knew of any English coming against 
23 
 
Venango.” 17  Just two days later, on August 12, he wrote of a 
conference with Tamaqua, the brother of his associate 
Pisquetomen and another Shawnee ally: “In the evening king 
Beaver came again, and told me, they had held a council, and sent 
out to all their towns, but it would take five days before they could 
all come together. I thanked him for his care.”18 It is probable Post 
would have needed to deviate from his typical English to 
communicate with the French or Shawnee, and it is even possible 
that another translator could have aided in these interactions. 
However, the author did not find a description of the linguistic path 
the conversations took relevant to his account of their occurrence, 
a demonstration of how the content of messages was often 
prioritized over methods of communication in colonial 
Pennsylvania. Conrad Weiser, a contemporary of Post who served 
in a similar capacity, generally provided even fewer details about 
language when documenting his work. In reference to negotiations 
with the Iroquois in September 1750, Weiser recorded only that “I 
Informed them of my Business . . . I told them of the letter I had 
from the Governor of Carolina about the Catabaws. He [the Oneida 
                                                          
17 Christian Frederick Post, The Journal of Christian Frederick Post, from 
Philadelphia to the Ohio, on a Message from the Government of Pensylvanio to 
the Delaware, Shawnese, and Mingo Indians, Settles There, in Early Western 
Travels, vol. 1, Journals of Conrad Weiser, 1748; George Croghan, 1750-1765; 
Christian Frederick Post, 1758; Thomas Morris, 1764, ed. Reuben Gold 
Thwaites (Cleveland, OH: A.H. Clark Co., 1904), Early Encounters in North 
America, Alexander Street Press, 2015 (accessed October 14, 2015), 192. 
18 Ibid., 193.  
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representative] told me that the Cat. would never sue for a 
peace.”19  
 It was not only professional negotiators who did not feel 
the need to explain details of conversations on Pennsylvania’s 
frontier. Christian Daniel Claus, a young German immigrant who 
accompanied Weiser in 1750, offered an interesting perspective in 
his account of the trip. Claus, who was as unfamiliar with his 
surroundings as he was with Indian customs, functioned more as 
an objective outsider than an involved participant like Weiser. At 
the beginning of his journal, he noted his hopes to “to pay good 
attention — as it recently became evident — to the name of the 
kingdom or empire wherever he happens to be . . . its regents, 
statutes, laws, liberties, prerogatives, pretensions, code of arms, 
ethics, mores, habits, language, commerce and income.” 20  His 
lofty intentions notwithstanding, Claus neglected to record the 
language of conversation when meeting with representatives of the 
Mohawks, Oneidas, and other nations. Like the more experienced 
messengers, he focused on the substance and subject of a 
communication rather than the features of its delivery. Even, or 
perhaps especially, in a sensitive and potentially serious situation, 
when learning of the death of an important ally, Claus said little 
about the actual communication of the information, writing only 
“we met an Indian hunter with the message that Canasatego, the 
                                                          
19 Weiser, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 11.  
20 Claus, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 6. 
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chief of the 6 Nations, had grown pale in death a few days ago. Mr. 
W. was alarmed and considered our long journey in vain because 
in such a case no council would be assembled.”21 Once again, the 
absence of the details illustrated the lack of importance they held 
for Weiser and Claus; their main concern was obtaining the facts, 
regardless of how they might be conveyed, and formulating a 
response that was both respectful and pragmatic. 
 For men like Post and Weiser, accustomed to 
communicating in different languages and writing primarily to 
keep track of their diplomatic successes and failures, actual 
methods of conversing were secondary in importance to the 
messages being passed back and forth. They were both in the 
employment of the provincial council of Pennsylvania and kept 
mainly English records, though Weiser was the more apt to stray 
from this convention, occasionally writing about personal matters 
in his native German.22 When English was clearly not the original 
language of a speech, both men typically provided a silent 
translation or interpretation, always keeping in mind the ultimate 
purpose of their records as reportable to the colonial government. 
 During the latter half of 1758, Post and his Indian associate 
Pisquetomen were once again called upon to deliver a message to 
several groups of Ohio Indians. While conferring with the 
Shawnee and members of the Five Nations, they encountered 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 42. 
22 Weiser, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 4.  
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several western Cherokee Indians, whom they likewise informed 
of the Pennsylvanian governor’s offer of peace between the 
nations. Post later wrote in his journal that “the Cherokees 
answered and said; ‘they should be glad to know how far the 
friendship was to reach; they, for themselves, wished it might 
reach from the sun-rise to the sun-set.”23 Though it is doubtful that 
Post delivered the message in its original English or received the 
reply in the same, he felt no need to make note of the perhaps 
multiple translations that were necessary before the parties 
achieved a mutual understanding. Only in exceptional cases did 
casual observers or experienced mediators explicitly mention 
linguistic issues or identify situations in which translation 
occurred. One example is found in the Observations of John 
Bartram, a naturalist who joined Weiser and his Oneida partner, 
Shickellamy, on a trip to Onondaga in the summer of 1743. 
Awakened in the middle of their first night at the Indian settlement 
by a disturbance outside the home in which they were staying, 
Bartram, essentially a tourist accompanying the diplomatic 
mission, was curious as to its cause. He recalled:   
I ask’d Conrad Weiser, who as well 
as myself lay next the alley, what 
noise that was? Shickalamy the 
Indian chief, our companion, who I 
supposed, thought me somewhat 
scared, called out, lye still John, I 
                                                          
23 Post, The Journal of Christian Frederick Post, 239.  
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never heard him speak so much plain 
English before.24  
 
The mysterious noise turned out to be nothing more than a 
customary Oneida ritual, but Shickellamy’s response is notable for 
its brevity, as it was evidently the longest English speech Bartram 
had ever heard the Oneida leader make. Whether Bartram was in 
truth “somewhat scared,” or not, the situation was sufficiently 
fraught to cause Shickellamy to break his own linguistic habits, 
drawing from Bartram a rare comment on speech.  
 Post had a comparable experience early on in his first 
diplomatic trip of 1758. Finding themselves lost, the party 
fortunately “met with an Indian, and one that I took to be a 
runagade English Indian trader; he spoke good English, was very 
curious in examining every thing.”25 Post’s considerable surprise 
at encountering an English-speaking Indian in the mountains 
twenty miles from Fort Duquesne merited his making a record of 
the incident. He must have regarded this individual as potentially 
important, perhaps thinking that he could be an asset to Post’s own 
mission or to Pennsylvanian diplomacy in general. Conversely, the 
English-speaking Indian and others like him could pose a threat to 
the colony’s interests, should they choose to ally instead with 
foreign forces.  
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 Weiser typically remarked upon the translation process 
when he felt that it could be especially relevant to the results of a 
discussion. Speaking on behalf of the Pennsylvania government at 
the 1750 council at Onondaga, he was forced to rely upon a Six 
Nations interpreter. Eager to clarify the particulars of the situation 
as a way to explain any possible errors, irregularities, or 
miscommunications, Weiser introduced his customary account of 
his speech by noting, “the speaker at my request and by my 
direction spoke again to the following purport and in my behalf.”26 
He repeated the qualifying statement several times in his 
description, later writing that he “gave a Belt of Wampum and 
desired the speaker to speak as follows.”27 His choice of the word 
“desired” in this passage is significant, as it indicates the 
uneasiness and uncertainty he felt, as well as makes an attempt to 
excuse him from responsibility for a potentially faulty translation. 
Surely Weiser, who was a prolific and successful interpreter, 
appreciated the difficulties and complexities of the job his Indian 
counterpart took on. At the same time, he expressed reservations 
about allowing someone other than himself to translate his 
message. 
  
 In context, Weiser’s hesitance is understandable; the basic 
differences between Indian and English modes of speech made 
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interpretation a difficult task even under the best of circumstances. 
A major, fundamental disparity between languages of European 
and North American origin is their utilization and subsequent 
connotations of figures of speech. For the majority of English-
speaking colonists, metaphors functioned as linguistic 
embellishment and were mostly used in literary settings rather than 
ordinary, day-to-day conversation. 28  They might also carry 
spiritual overtones, as the strongly Protestant population of 
Pennsylvania would have been familiar with Biblical proverbs 
through religious education and church attendance. Conversely for 
Indians, figures of speech operated as a standard of language, used 
in a variety of situations including discussion of mundane 
matters.29 Indians’ tendency towards metaphor drew comment and 
response from colonists on several occasions and ultimately 
influenced the language of diplomacy between the two.  
 This feature of Indian speech was documented from the 
earliest instances of English contact. In 1682 at a treaty signing 
with William Penn near Philadelphia, the Delaware chief 
Tammany expressed his hopes that the two nations would “live as 
brothers as long as the sun and moon shine in the sky.” 30 
Significantly, the records of this meeting indicate Tammany’s use 
of English when speaking with Penn – a notable occurrence, 
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especially so early on in the colony’s existence. The chief’s 
willingness and ability to translate his words himself, rather than 
employing a third party as became customary into the eighteenth 
century, demonstrated his desire to communicate openly with 
Penn. However, his words also provide information regarding 
methods of translation. Rather than attempt to convert Indian 
metaphors into conventional English phrases, Tammany and other 
interpreters favored a literal method of translation. The result was a 
message that came closer to the original Delaware words than a 
broader translation might have done, but one that required a greater 
deal of analysis on the colonial side. 
   References to Indian usage of figures of speech are found 
in a variety of colonial records. In observing a discussion between 
the Shawnee and Six Nations factions at Fort Duquesne in 
November of 1758, Christian Frederick Post noted representatives’ 
mutual, respectful acknowledgment of gifts and appropriate 
ceremonies: “King Beaver [Tamaqua] addressed himself to the 
Cayuga chief, and said. . . . you have wiped the tears from our 
eyes, and cleaned our bodies from the blood; when you spoke to 
me I saw myself all over bloody; and since you cleaned me I feel 
myself quite pleasant through my whole body.”31 This statement 
was a reference to the At the Woods’ Edge ceremony, performed 
to ready travelers for diplomatic talks, but it also recognized the 
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relationship between the two Indian groups.32 In his reply to the 
Shawnee, the Cayuga speaker made similar use of metaphor in 
describing the establishment of peace between his people and the 
colonial government of Pennsylvania. He urged his “cousins” to 
follow the Six Nations’ example, proclaiming, “We likewise take 
the tomahawk out of your hands, that you received from the white 
people; use it no longer. . . . when I came I found you in a moving 
posture, ready to jump towards the sunset, so we will set you at 
ease, and quietly down.”33 The records of these conversations are 
incomplete and imperfect, a translated version only representative 
of what Post was allowed to witness and what he chose to 
document for personal purposes. Nevertheless, they provide 
evidence of communication between different native groups and 
the language they used, confirming that by the mid-eighteenth 
century, inter-Indian relations operated in similar ways as colonial 
diplomacy did. 
 Though Indians and colonists were accustomed to differing 
characteristics of communication, they developed a common 
method for conducting official business. The text of the Lancaster 
Treaty of 1744 exemplifies the ways in which Pennsylvanian and 
native officials came to a linguistic compromise, each adopting 
elements of the other’s speech to create a discourse somewhere 
between the literal and metaphorical. At the opening of the treaty 
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conference on June 25, Governor George Thomas addressed 
representatives from Virginia, Maryland, and the Six Nations, 
announcing to the Indians that the three united colonial 
governments were “come to enlarge the Fire, which was almost 
gone out, and to make it burn clearer; to brighten the Chain which 
had contracted some Rust, and to renew their Friendship with 
you.” 34 In this part of his speech, Thomas made reference to a 
council fire, an important feature of negotiations for Indians and 
one to which the Six Nations attendees would have been 
accustomed. Despite the absence of an actual fire at the Lancaster 
courthouse, the governor recognized the suggestion of one as a 
polite gesture towards his audience. After setting the tone for 
discussion, Thomas went on to describe in more concrete terms 
Pennsylvania’s wishes for peace between the Indians and English 
colonies.35  
 The Six Nations delegation, aware of the differences 
between conversing with a seasoned interpreter like Weiser or Post 
and the colonial commissioners, made similar alterations in their 
methods of address. Tachanoontia, the Indian speaker, made 
repeated allusions to geography during his response to the Virginia 
coalition on June 27. He spoke of hills, mountains, and roads in a 
tangible sense, mixing the literal with the metaphorical tradition of 
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the Iroquois language. Describing the broken terms of an earlier 
treaty, Tachanoontia lamented that “We had not been long in the 
Use of this new Road before your People came, like Flocks of 
Birds and sat down on both Sides of it . . . we are now opening our 
Hearts to you, we cannot avoid complaining, and desire all these 
Affairs may be settled.” 36  At Lancaster in 1744, as at other 
councils that followed, colonists and Indians operated within an 
increasingly integrated system of interactions, blending elements 
from their own cultures to create a new type of diplomatic 
protocol. Linguistic features represented only part of this combined 
culture, which developed further into the mid-eighteenth century.37  
 Though members of both parties generally worked towards 
the goal of mutual comprehension, in some situations errors were 
unavoidable. Whether in informal or formal settings, at times 
individuals did not want to understand others or to be understood 
themselves. The deliberate failure to comprehend was not 
restricted to either native or colonial representatives. There were 
any number of motivations for willful misunderstandings, each 
unique to the situation in which it occurred and the characters 
involved. In his account of his 1750 journey to Onondaga in the 
company of Conrad Weiser, Christian Daniel Claus recorded an 
instance in which the group, once again lost in the woods, was 
caught in a rainstorm with nightfall quickly approaching. Luckily, 
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“we finally encountered 2 Indians. . . . Mr. Weiser inquired from 
them whether this path led to Cornet Johnson’s but they did not 
want to understand any of this.” 38  Weiser and his group were 
eventually able to convince the Indians to provide directions to 
Fort Hunter, but their initial reluctance could have stemmed from 
several sources. Perhaps they were wary of the strangers and, as 
they were outnumbered, feared for their personal safety. They 
might have had previous unpleasant encounters with colonists and 
hoped to avoid a repeat. If they were familiar with the colonial 
representatives and their mission, they might have even had a 
greater motivation in attempting to delay negotiations in any way 
possible. Conversely, their confusion may have been entirely 
genuine, as Claus was inexperienced in communication with 
Indians and could have easily misjudged the situation. 
 Willful misunderstandings did not always ensue from 
chance encounters, as evidenced in Witham Marshe’s Journal of 
the Treaty Held with the Six Nations, June – July 1744. Marshe, 
who served as scribe for the conferences and secretary to the 
Maryland Treaty Commissioners, noted in his personal papers 
Conrad Weiser’s directions for colonists who had the opportunity 
to interact with the Iroquois representatives. 39  The interpreter 
advised against outward remarks on Indians’ habits, speech, or 
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physical appearance, warning that the Indians would take offense 
since “most of them understood English, though they will not 
speak it when they are in treaty.” 40  The Iroquois present at 
Lancaster chose not to utilize their knowledge of the English 
language within the context of the treaty negotiations, opting 
instead to operate in their native tongue.  They might have been 
hesitant about their own abilities and fearful of misspeaking, but it 
is likely that custom had at least some part in their decision. In 
Indian tradition, an appointed speaker often acted on behalf of 
elders or officials to communicate a ruling to the group at large. 
This individual might be particularly oratorically gifted or 
practiced in the art of speech delivery.41 Additionally, as Nancy 
Hagedorn noted in her study of Indian interpreters as cultural 
intermediaries, at a conference “Protocol entitled each party to 
speak in its own language so all speeches had to be translated into 
the language of the listeners by an interpreter.”42 In this way, a 
willful misunderstanding among Indians stemmed from traditions 
and served not as an obstacle but as a mark of respect for all 
involved and for the significance of the situation. 
 Just as listeners sometimes consciously chose which words 
they would understand, speakers could be selective about those 
they wanted to communicate. When interpretation was necessary, 
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mediators had the responsibility and opportunity to alter and edit a 
message for content before conveying it to the intended audience. 
At times like these, the linguistic and cultural knowledge possessed 
by those like Weiser, Montour, and Post became essential. 
Through an interpreter’s intervention, representatives could avoid 
issues ranging from a simple slip in etiquette to a potential 
diplomatic disaster.43  
 Putting their common interests ahead of personal gain, 
translators worked together under fractious conditions. Post noted 
this kind of cooperation in 1758 when he witnessed Tamaqua’s 
rejection of a dispatch from an English general. The Shawnee 
directed that the messenger “‘should go back over the mountains; 
we have nothing to say to the contrary.’ Neither Mr. Croghn [sic] 
nor Andrew Montour would tell Colonel Bouquet the Indians’ 
answer.”44 Post and his negotiator colleagues George Croghan and 
Andrew Montour met with colonial aggravation at their refusal, but 
nevertheless seemingly felt justified in their decision to do what 
they could in order to avert outright contention. Sir William 
Johnson expressed a similar outlook in a 1757 letter, writing that 
while he occasionally found he needed to amend exchanges, he 
attempted to do so “without deviating from their meaning, because 
I found them rather more animated than they often are, or than I 
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desired.” 45 Most often, selective communication occurred in the 
interest of preserving positive relations, rather than to further 
personal interests. The potential for abuse by interpreters did exist, 
emphasizing the need to identify reliable, trustworthy, and 
competent individuals to serve in this capacity.46   
 Selectivity in translation was not a quality restricted to 
those in the employ of Pennsylvania. There was a strong historical 
basis for this practice, dating to the mid-seventeenth century in 
land arbitrations between the governors of New Sweden and the 
Delaware Indians living in what would become Eastern 
Pennsylvania.47 The legacy of this diplomacy became clear as Post 
conferred with Pisquetomen and other native companions in 
preparation to depart Easton for Kushkushking on November 12, 
1758. The interpreter requested the Indians’ cooperation as he 
attempted to portray the Pennsylvania Provincial Council and 
English military forces in as favorable a manner as possible. He 
recollected a situation in which the roles were reversed, 
remembering that “when I left Alleghenny I dropt all evil reports, 
and only carried the agreeable news.”48 The Delaware recognized 
the influence a messenger could have in providing an account that 
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came from an optimistic perspective or one that merely minimized 
the likelihood of igniting controversy. These abridged reports were 
not deliberately or maliciously misleading or incomplete; rather 
when put in context, these were situations in which participants felt 
the ends justified the means. In reference to his appeal for 
assistance, Post recorded that his Indian allies “took it very 
kindly,” signifying the atmosphere of solidarity that pervaded 
among those in negotiating roles.49 Regardless of mediators’ good 
intentions and cross-cultural efforts to ease communication 
difficulties, some incongruities posed even greater challenges.   
 
 A basic discrepancy between Indian and colonial cultures 
was their usage and treatment of the written word. The effects of 
this fundamental difference were pervasive, as evidenced in the 
organization of a 1757 meeting between Six Nations Indians and 
colonial officials. George Croghan, negotiator, translator, and 
coordinator of the conference, described his preparations to the 
Iroquois leaders, recalling that in order to contact Indian and 
colonial participants, “I dispatched Messengers up Sasquehannah, 
and to Ohio, and I wrote to your Brother, Sir William Johnson.”50 
This twofold planning process, while involved, was necessary in 
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order to properly observe the conventions of each culture, one 
relying upon written and the other strictly verbal communication.  
 Residents of Pennsylvania, descended from the Western 
European tradition, depended on textual records for a wide variety 
of purposes. While literacy was far from universal, writing had an 
important part in many spheres of colonial life and served as an 
important channel of communication. 51  Authors could maintain 
contact with individuals and groups both near and far through 
mediums including private letters, public missives, newspapers, 
pamphlets, and books. Additionally, official messages and treaties, 
as well as personal accounts, journals, and letters by eyewitnesses 
specifically addressed issues of intercultural relations and 
translation between English and Indian languages.  
 Prior to contact with Europeans, most Indians were 
unfamiliar with the concepts of alphabetical texts, since oral 
tradition took precedence in their cultures. Indians had 
corresponding concerns to those of colonists, and similarly needed 
to keep records of legislative, organizational, religious, and 
familial matters, among others. Native accounts were preserved 
verbally, rather than in writing, and transferred between 
individuals through a careful and involved process of learning and 
memorization. 52  It is important to note that a lack of written 
language did not make Indians strictly illiterate – use of this term 
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carries a negative connotation and implies a type of inadequacy as 
it indicates one’s inability to read and write. It is more accurate to 
characterize the native speakers of Algonquian and Iroquois 
languages as nonliterate, a term which Nancy Hagedorn uses to 
suggest that they simply had no need for reading or writing.53  
 The preservation of records, messages, and news in an oral 
sense clearly placed a considerable demand upon one’s memory. 
The individuals entrusted with these responsibilities were called 
upon to act as speakers at councils and other events when their 
knowledge was pertinent. At such conferences, Indian listeners 
placed great value on accuracy, freely expressing confirmation of 
facts in support of an orator or vocalizing doubts when information 
was disputable. 54  Colonial representatives on several occasions 
noted the aptitude of Indian speakers, expressing surprise and 
admiration at the extent of their capabilities. Claus, whose 
inexperience in Indian ways once again inspired a frank and 
informative report, noted that during the 1750 council at 
Onondaga:  
a speaker was chosen among these 
councilors, who had to recite the 
articles mentioned before in the 
public assembly in the form of an 
oration. . . . He had to learn the 
different points verbatim by heart 
and when he had nothing further to 
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hand out, he continued to recite until 
all the articles were read.55 
 
Veteran mediators like Weiser and Post were accustomed to Indian 
practices of documentation, but for those like Claus it must have 
been somewhat jarring to observe an Indian representative deliver 
a lengthy recitation on detailed terms of negotiation entirely from 
memory. Colonists generally saw Indian nonliteracy as a sign of 
incompetence and questioned the accuracy of the messages they 
delivered. Their opinions drew different responses from Indians, 
some expressing reinforced confidence in their cultural traditions 
and others beginning to doubt the legitimacy of oral recordkeeping, 
especially in comparison to the advantages of written language.   
 In the spring of 1757, Indians attending a conference with 
colonial representatives from Pennsylvania and New York had the 
latter response. Over a month after the meetings began, an Oneida 
sachem named Thomas King, along with his Mohawk allies, 
prepared to deliver a response to the Pennsylvanian governor’s 
proposals of the previous day. George Croghan noted that King 
prefaced his speech by offering an anticipatory apology to his 
audience, requesting their understanding if the Indians “should 
make any Blunders, or have forgot any Part of the Speech . . . as 
they could not write; therefore were obliged to keep every Thing in 
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their Memory.”56 This statement was atypical of general sentiment 
among Indians but shows the effects interaction with doubtful 
colonists had upon some of them. Susan Katler, editor of 
Croghan’s Minutes of Conferences, postulated that King’s self-
deprecation stemmed from his interactions with Christian 
missionaries who voiced misgivings about the Iroquois’ entirely 
verbal methods of recordkeeping and communication.57 Regardless 
of the basis for his uncertainty, King’s comments are an example 
of how cultural exchange, reactions, and responses on the 
Pennsylvania frontier shaped attitudes and habits about language 
use. 
  Mistrust of unfamiliar linguistic practices was not 
restricted to colonists. Native Americans, who were by the late 
seventeenth century largely acquainted with the concept of written 
English, nevertheless remained cautious regarding its reliability. 
Very few Indians could read, and as a result their opinions on 
writing were complex and easily misinterpreted, even by those as 
well-informed as Christian Frederick Post. 58  Twice in his 1758 
journal, the interpreter remarked at the “jealousy” Indians 
exhibited at colonists’ abilities to read and write. However, Post 
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additionally observed that when he was called upon to compose a 
letter to an English general on behalf of the Shawnee, “they were 
afraid I would, at the same time, give other information, and this 
perplexed them.” 59  While Post’s Indian allies may have been 
“jealous” of his literacy, if only because they desired to write their 
messages themselves, it is also significant that they were also both 
“afraid” and “perplexed.” This mixed response demonstrates their 
general wariness towards the written word and colonists’ use of it. 
Unable to authenticate public or private communications or legal 
documents on their own, Indians found themselves at a 
disadvantage to literate colonists as they were forced to rely 
completely on translators who displayed varying degrees of 
trustworthiness.   
 Consequently, despite feeling uneasy about the topic, some 
Indians expressed a desire to learn about and adopt written 
language for diplomatic purposes. During a 1742 meeting with 
colonial officials at Philadelphia, Six Nations delegates represented 
both approaches. 60  The Iroquois insisted that the agreements 
reached at the council be summarized in a signed document, as 
they felt this option was more certain than a reliance solely on 
colonial memory. However, in a subversive moment during 
negotiations, Canassatego, an Onondaga sachem, reproached the 
Maryland commissioners for their failure to honor a land deed 
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signed over fifty years previously. 61  The Indian representatives 
clearly recognized the functions and importance of written text, but 
their inability to fully access or enforce its contents complicated 
the situation.   
 This conflicted attitude dated back to the first decades of 
Pennsylvania’s existence. Indian concerns were justified, as 
illustrated by a conflict that arose in the spring of 1700 between 
colonists and native residents living outside Lancaster.62 In May, 
Shawnee leaders Connoodaghtoh and Meealloua contacted 
William Penn to protest the actions of colonial vigilantes in 
imprisoning four unidentified Indians, who were possibly runaway 
servants of families in New York. The Indians accused that the 
previous fall, two colonists “produced a paper with a large Seale 
and pretendednded it was a warrant From the goverr For to require 
them to deliver the said Indians.” Suspicious of these credentials 
and unwilling to abandon those under his protection, Meealloua 
demanded further proof that Penn had given permission for the 
arrests. Returning later with reinforcements, including one man 
who claimed to be second in command to Penn, the colonists 
“produced another paper with a large seale and againe demanded 
the said Indians in the governours name.”63 The Indians remained 
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unconvinced; their continued refusal to cooperate led to an 
atmosphere of tension and threats of violence that inspired their 
appeal to the proprietor.  
 The contents of this source are telling, demonstrating that 
Indians who worried about being taken advantage of through 
counterfeit documents or inaccurate translations, as mentioned in 
Post’s account, were justified in their apprehensions. However, the 
existence of the source itself offers an opportunity for 
interpretation. The fact that two native representatives chose to 
contact Penn in writing just two decades after the colony’s 
establishment shows Indian recognition of the medium’s 
consequence early on. Unfortunately, there is little evidence 
available concerning the composition of this message. It seems 
unlikely that it was physically penned by the leaders themselves, as 
the letter closes with a note referring to “Conodahto marke” and 
“The marke of Meealloua” rather than the men’s signatures, 
suggesting that they, like most Indians, were nonliterate. 64  The 
clerical mistakes, grammatical inconsistencies, and lack of 
standardized spelling within the document hint that the writer was 
not highly skilled or well-practiced as a scribe.  
 With no direct mentions of language, it is unclear whether 
the English words were chosen by Connoodaghtoh and Meealloua 
or by an anonymous translator on their behalf. 65  Still, the pair 
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were aware of the immediacy of their situation and understood that 
alerting Penn with a written document was a viable and efficient 
option. They therefore accessed what resources they had in order 
to produce the letter. Their actions make them an example of the 
group of Indians who, regardless of their personal feelings about 
English written text, chose to adopt and employ this colonial 
practice for their own ends, contributing to the larger systems of 
linguistic exchange occurring at the time.  
 Indians attempted to use English writing for different 
reasons and with varying results. Some might have seen 
acceptance of the system as a way to increase their status or 
credibility in colonial opinion. For others, it was less a matter of 
choice – if they hoped to be able to fully understand English law, 
terms of treaties, and correspondence, they would have to assent 
and conform to foreign standards.66 An example of the inconsistent 
situation Indians faced, as well as their varying responses, can be 
gathered from different accounts of the signing of the Lancaster 
Treaty of 1744. Within the official, published account of the 
conferences, the Six Nations deputies are depicted as cautious of 
written text and vigilant of its documentation, yet willing to invoke 
it in support of their cause. When the governor of Virginia made 
reference to a letter of several years earlier that authorized the sale 
of Indian land, the Onondoga delegation responded with a demand 
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to see the letter itself, as well as to be provided information on its 
supposed authors and interpreters. 67  Though unable to read the 
letter, the Six Nations officials were clearly both skeptical of its 
origins and aware of its importance. Determined not to let a lack of 
information harm their chances of reaching a fair settlement with 
the colonies, they took what steps they could to authenticate the 
Virginian claims with textual evidence. 
 In both official and informal settings, Indians who began to 
make the shift toward usage of written language demonstrated 
engagement with texts and eagerness to understand them, tempered 
with a concern for accuracy in interpretation and honesty from 
colonial officials. Outwardly, these interests were not always 
apparent, as in 1744 at Lancaster. Observing a land transfer, 
Witham Marshe, the young Maryland secretary, commented in his 
journal that “several chiefs, who had not signed the deed of release 
. . . did now cheerfully, and without any hesitation.”68 To casual 
observers like Marshe, it might have seemed as though the 
Iroquois did not grasp the significance of signing the deed, or that 
they were unconcerned with the particulars of the agreement. 
Behind the scenes, however, the process was more complicated, as 
Indians were careful to keep themselves informed and consulted 
with those colonists they knew well and trusted before committing 
to any written document. Conrad Weiser, one such individual, 
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described Indians’ interest in physical documents in his account of 
a 1743 journey to Onondaga. Carrying messages from the 
Pennsylvanian and Virginian governors to the Six Nations, Weiser 
was somewhat surprised when approached by a small group of 
Indian leaders, who asked him to explain the messages rather than 
only delivering them to the council in the traditional form of 
presentation, so that they might better understand and form a 
response.69 This exchange represented another instance in which 
an interpreter acted as a resource to Indians, serving not only as a 
translator but as a cultural mediator, in this case specifically on 
linguistic issues.70   
 Indians increasingly expressed the desire to gain familiarity 
with written language into the mid-eighteenth century. A few even 
learned how to read and write themselves, demonstrating the extent 
of their knowledge of the English language. At a treaty council 
between Delawares and Pennsylvanian colonists held at Easton in 
1756, the Indian interpreter John Pumpshire worked with 
Teedyuscung, the notorious Delaware representative, among 
others. Pumpshire, also known as Cawkeeponen, merited acclaim 
for his skills from both participating groups. His interpretation 
abilities were not restricted to the spoken word, as on July 1, he 
wrote a letter to an English captain at Fort Allen on behalf of 
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Captain Newcastle, a representative for the Iroquois.71  
 By writing this letter, Pumpshire personified the 
contemporary cultural exchange in written language between 
Pennsylvania’s Indians and colonists. Through his communication 
of the message for Newcastle, Pumpshire echoed Indian oratorical 
traditions that identified performance and the use of a secondary 
speaker as conventional symbols of respect. In his use of the 
English language, written text, and even the physical materials 
used to compose the letter such as paper and ink, the Delaware 
implemented elements of colonial culture, whether consciously or 
not. At the close of the message to the English officer, Pumpshire 
signed his name, while the nonliterate Newcastle provided his 
mark.72 The actions of these Indians were a tangible demonstration 
of the ways in which individuals, languages, and cultures 
converged to influence communication in colonial Pennsylvania.   
 
 This letter and the method of its composition exemplified, 
albeit on a small scale, the attempts at unification of Indian and 
European linguistic customs, written and spoken, that was taking 
place across Pennsylvania at the time. Both natives and colonists 
recognized the authority of and opportunities that a new system of 
communication, distinct from those that had existed previously, 
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could offer. 73  Despite the efforts of notable figures, respected 
mediators, and individuals determined to convey their thoughts and 
opinions to those of different cultural backgrounds, basic 
disparities in language created momentous challenges to the 
development of a common form of interaction. Motivated by 
necessity, residents of the colony found flawed ways to manage 
issues of interpreting spoken and written language. Ultimately, the 
incongruence between Indian and colonial methods of 
communication was a major contributing factor to the diplomatic 
difficulties these two cultures experienced.  
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Creating a Statesman: The Early Life of Prince 
Clemens von Metternich and its Effect on His 
Political Philosophy 
By 
Ryan Nadeau 
~      ~ 
 
A Timeline of Key Events in Metternich’s Early Life 
 
1773: Metternich born in Coblenz, the Archbishopric of Trier, to 
Francis George and Maria Beatrice von Metternich. 
 
1786: Friedrich Simon becomes his private tutor. 
 
1788: Enrollment at Strasbourg University until 1790; Studies 
under Koch. 
 
1789: Outbreak of revolution in France; Looting of Strasbourg by 
revolutionaries; Refugee French aristocrats take up 
residence in Coblenz and the surrounding Rhineland. 
 
1790: Coronation of Emperor Francis II; Enrollment at Mainz 
University until 1793; Studies under Vogt. 
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1792: Coronation of Emperor Leopold II; Prussian army in 
Coblenz; Prussia army defeated at Valmy. 
 
1793: Fall of Mainz; Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette executed in 
France; Beginning of the Reign of Terror; Metternich to 
Brussels; Capture of Valenciennes. 
 
1794: Mission to Great Britain; Fall of the Austrian Netherlands; 
Fall of Coblenz; Relocation to Vienna. 
 
 
The nineteenth century in Europe was a period defined 
politically by competing empires and revolutions of political 
thought, characterized by brilliant statesmen whose influence could 
be felt across the continent and changed the course of nations. One 
of these statesmen was Prince Clemens von Metternich, who the 
historical record remembers as one of the Austrian Empire’s 
greatest diplomats and one of Europe’s most infamous 
archconservatives. Fulfilling both of these roles, Metternich is the 
man most frequently viewed as the chief facilitator of the Concert 
of Europe – the system of international cooperation and 
negotiation following the Napoleonic wars designed to maintain 
the European balance of power and to uphold the integrity of the 
continent’s monarchies. These principles defined his nearly fifty-
years of policy making. Having entered Austria’s diplomatic 
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service as a young man at the dawn of the century, he quickly 
made a name for himself during the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
Wars due to his central role at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, where 
he helped redraw the borders of Europe and re-establish the old 
monarchal order. Throughout his long career, he established 
himself as a committed opponent of revolutionary activity, 
liberalism, and nationalism, always working to maintain the 
strength of Europe’s traditional empires – especially in his adopted 
home of Austria. His career concluded in 1848 when Austria, like 
Europe as a whole, faced liberal uprisings on a scale which could 
only barely be contained, signaling the end of Metternich’s age of 
conservatism. 
Despite his illustrious career, under no circumstances did 
Metternich simply spring from the ground, destined to guide the 
progression of history. He was instead entirely the product of his 
society. His family was one of prosperous Rhenish nobles well-
integrated into the imperial mechanisms of the Holy Roman 
Empire and strongly influenced by aristocratic French culture. His 
education focused on history and science, and occurred 
concurrently with the French Revolution, the excesses of which 
Metternich bore witness to on more than one occasion. Most 
Metternich biographers pay little attention to these formative years, 
instead spending far more time studying the man that he would 
become and his political legacy. This, however, minimizes the 
importance of a crucial stage of development in humans: the early 
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and formative years, in which frequently lie the seeds of future 
actions. A study of Metternich’s background and early life can 
help to explain the development of his later philosophies as natural 
developments of the cultural, intellectual, and political forces 
which surrounded him. 
 To understand how exactly the past defines the future, 
however, a firm grip must be held on what exactly the future 
entails, or in this case, Metternich’s political philosophy. With 
broad strokes, his doctrines can be divided into three key 
principles: the balance of power, legitimacy, and conservatism, 
each one explaining and reinforcing the others. Self-evident as per 
its label, the balance of power principle dictates the need for a 
political and military equilibrium among between European 
nations, designed to prevent the domination of any single state 
over any other. The desire to conquer and rule Europe as a 
hegemon was a very real ambition for European leaders prior to 
the Congress of Vienna. Wars of containment had been fought 
against rising powers for centuries: first against the Habsburg 
dynasty in the Thirty Years’ War, then against Louis XIV’s 
France, and finally against Napoleon. According to Henry 
Kissinger, “[The balance-of-power system] was meant to limit 
both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of 
conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and 
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moderation.”74 Ultimately, this was Metternich’s goal, as not only 
would a non-Austrian hegemon naturally rival his empire, but war, 
as he saw it, was uncontrollable. He expounded on this point in 
1821, writing that “once it [had] begun laws are no longer imposed 
by the will of man but by force of circumstance.”75 A balance of 
power thus kept wars in Europe under control and maintained 
societal stability, avoiding the catastrophic situations which had 
characterized the past two-hundred years.  
 Rounding that principle out are the principles of legitimacy 
and conservativism, which can be seen as nearly inseparable. The 
first demands support for the monarchical regimes of Europe, no 
matter the circumstances. The second opposes sweeping liberal 
political reform in the style that the French Revolution had aimed 
for. According to Metternich, monarchy was the very symbol of 
law and order in Europe from which all laws emanated. As such, 
he believed in supporting them not because of a divine right, but 
because failing to do so would undermine the entire continent’s 
social order, leading to chaos. Revolutionaries and reformers that 
would severely limit the power of monarchs or overthrow them 
altogether were thus to be rigorously opposed by all European 
states for that very reason. If revolution seized control of a 
monarchical state, then European monarchs were to intervene to 
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restore order, as a protection of their very own legitimacy.76 Thus, 
the three principles of Metternich’s philosophy were rooted in the 
fundamentally pragmatic goal of maintaining the rule of law and 
keeping Europe generally in order by maintaining both 
international and domestic stasis. 
Historians disagree on how these principles and 
motivations reflect upon his personal character, though 
undertaking research on Metternich’s life and philosophy in the 
English language is a problematic task. Several influential studies 
of his life and character, such as Heinrich Ritter von Srbik’s 1925 
biographical masterpiece Metternich der Staatsmann und der 
Mensch, remain untranslated from their original language. 
Additionally, while Richard von Metternich’s Memoirs of Prince 
Metternich, a compilation of his father’s uncompleted 
autobiography and letters remains a valuable first-hand account of 
the statesman’s life, it is by no means a complete collection of 
Metternich sources, with numerous letters and documents 
remaining untranslated. Commenting on this situation, French 
biographer Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny remarked that “the 
historiography on Metternich in English is markedly less plentiful 
than that in French and still less than that in German. The English 
edition of the Memoires et Documents of the prince de Metternich 
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is only half the size of the German and French editions.”77 While 
much English biography has emerged utilizing superior French and 
German resources, until greater interest is taken in translating the 
entire collection of Metternich documents from their native 
languages, scholarship on him which relies solely on English 
sources will lack the full breadth of resources that could be 
available. Such is the predicament faced by this very study of 
Metternich’s early life—though not one which will diminish the 
validity of the conclusions drawn through available resources. 
Generally, English sources can be divided into three broad 
categories: those written before the First World War, those written 
in the interwar period, and those written following the Second 
World War, which reflect the changing views of Metternich’s 
character over time.  
Published in 1888, Colonel George Bruce Malleson’s Life 
of Prince Metternich was one of the earliest Metternich 
biographies available in English. Written only eight years after 
Richard von Metternich’s published his Memoirs, Malleson’s 
biography relied heavily on it as a resource. In many places, he 
simply rephrased and restated the account of Metternich’s early 
life as recorded within the Memoirs, making little effort to analyze 
the events of that period. 78  The later biographer G. A. C. 
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Sandeman wrote little more on the subject, despite the greater 
length of his text overall. 79  Both ultimately shared the same 
eventual conclusion on Metternich as well: that he was a deeply 
flawed individual with an overall negative impact on European 
history. For his part, Malleson portrayed Metternich as the 
architect of “velvet-gloved despotism,” who single-handedly kept 
nationalism subdued for decades. Sandeman, however, took the 
opposite stance, arguing that Metternich in fact was little more 
than a political opportunist whose success entirely rested upon his 
personal charm rather than on any concrete political ideology, and 
thus to see him as a Machiavellian schemer is foolish.80 As pre-war 
authors, both Malleson and Sandeman were emblematic of the 
hostility still maintained toward Metternich on principle. 
Liberalism and nationalism were the popular ideologies of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and thus very few had any 
desire to give serious consideration to the ultimate opponent of 
both. 81  It thus seems reasonable to conclude that both authors 
were deeply influenced by this universal hostility, finding little 
value in understanding the development of a man whom they only 
saw in a negative fashion. 
With the First World War, however, came a reassessment 
of Metternich. Many viewed the war’s destruction as a product of 
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nationalistic thought. With alternatives to liberalism concurrently 
growing in popularity, Metternich’s legacy and character began to 
be looked at differently. Nostalgia for the peaceful days of the 
Concert of Europe almost seemed to be propagated, inverting the 
old negative views, as this was the period in which von Srbik’s 
1925 biography became the most radically revisionist and positive 
view of Metternich since his death. In it, von Srbik discarded the 
old characterizations and portrayed Metternich as a brilliant and 
coherent statesman worthy of respect.82 In English, Algernon Cecil 
followed von Srbik’s lead, and while he gave a much more positive 
treatment than previous authors, he was once more not one who 
possessed a highly insightful view into Metternich’s formative 
years, going little further than imaginative and unresolved 
speculation on the effect they may have had on the statesman. 
Perhaps the currents of revisionism went too far, with historians of 
this time now too interested in praising Metternich’s supposed 
genius rather than determining from whence it came. Still, interwar 
historians were able to break the stigma surrounding his legacy, 
allowing future historians to study him seriously, rather than 
writing him off as a dead and buried political boogeyman.83  
It is perhaps only since the Second World War that 
historians have regarded Metternich more objectively rather than 
                                                          
82 Ibid, 2. 
83 Algernon Cecil, Metternich 1773-1859: A Study of his Period and Personality 
(New York: The  Macmillan Company, 1933),  11-22. 
64 
 
through lenses tinted by political dispute. The year 1959 marked 
the one-hundredth anniversary of Metternich’s death, yet not a 
single one of the Empires that he had tried to balance remained, 
with imperialism grossly out of style. These developments 
reflected how far the world had come since the days of Metternich 
and benefited historians dethatching themselves personally from 
the statesman’s ideas without the clouding effects of national pride 
or political grudges. In 1952, Constantin de Grunwald seriously 
questioned the role of Metternich’s teachers on his political 
development, delving into details on their scholarly specialties 
from the Memoirs that previous biographers had virtually 
ignored. 84  Much later, in 1991, Desmond Seward paid deep 
attention to Metternich’s often glossed-over early career as an 
assistant to his father, the imperial envoy to the Austrian 
Netherlands, and that experience’s effect on his own career. 85  
Even earlier, and perhaps at long last, Alan Palmer’s 1972 
biography had finally come to admit the need to understand 
Metternich’s early life on a more than superficial level in order to 
fully understand the man that he would become.86 Furthermore, all 
three authors offered nuanced analyses of his character that 
captured both the good and the bad inherent in a man as dynamic 
as Metternich had been, demonstrating a level of biographical 
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sophistication that is perhaps only obtainable with sufficient 
temporal distance from the subject, especially with one so 
controversial. As such, it is these modern biographies that are most 
useful in understanding the early life of Metternich, and whose 
even-handed, honest, and detailed investigation of their subject is 
best followed in future studies such as this. 
Ultimately, all Metternich biographers must start at the 
very beginning, whether they delve deeply into the implications of 
it or not: the circumstances of his birth. Metternich was born in the 
Rhenish city of Coblenz on 15 May, 1773, to Francis George von 
Metternich and his wife, Maria Beatrice von Kageneck.87 At this 
time, Francis was a highly active diplomat in the service of various 
Holy Roman states and their Habsburg overlords, holding, at 
various points in his life, titles such as chamberlain to both the 
Archbishops of Trier and Mainz, minister at the imperial court, and 
imperial ambassador to the Rhenish electorates and Austrian 
Netherlands.88  Time spent in the Austrian capital of Vienna as a 
young man in the 1760s had won him the attention of both the 
legendary state chancellor Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz as well as 
the Empress Maria Theresa. The two ultimately helped negotiate 
his marriage to Maria Beatrice, a vivacious noblewoman in the 
Empress’s favor who hailed from Austria-controlled Bohemia.89 
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The Metternichs themselves were, by this point, already a 
distinguished family, having produced several archbishops of both 
Mainz, where the Counts von Metternich had traditionally served 
as hereditary chamberlain, and Trier, under whose authority the 
family estate at Coblenz lay. As Mainz and Trier were members of 
the imperial electorate well connected to the Austrian hegemony, 
the Metternichs’ own connections to them ensured they remained a 
relevant, if minor, family.90 By Metternich’s own words, it was the 
courtly machinations of both his parents which led to his 
engagement to his first wife, Eleonore von Kaunitz, the 
granddaughter of the state chancellor.91  
Despite ending his career in professional disgrace due to 
his untimely oversight of the Austrian Netherlands at the time of 
their fall to revolutionary French forces, Francis von Metternich 
left a profound legacy on his son. Cynically dismissive of the 
revolutionary political upheaval of the time, he maintained the firm 
belief that “this business will work out one way or another, like 
everything else,” a phrase which Metternich himself could have 
uttered in reference to revolution and his unshakable faith in the 
authority of monarchy. Francis won the trust of the Habsburg 
emperors with his honesty and loyalty, securing his family’s 
position in their favor even after the destruction of his diplomatic 
                                                          
90 Sandeman Metternich, 4-9. 
91 Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Fürst von Metternich, Memoirs of Prince 
Metternich: 1773-1835, vol. 1, ed. Richard von Metternich (New York: C. 
Scribner’s Sons, 1880), 21-22. 
67 
 
career.92  While physically described as being “as heavily German 
as the Hanoverian Georges,” by Palmer, it seems more fair to 
borrow a phrase from Cecil, that “not the light beer of Vienna but 
the sparkling wine of the Rhineland ran in the veins of the 
Metternichs,” upon reflecting on his personal behavior.93 Francis 
was a figure emblematic of the “French social life and moral laxity 
which characterized the smaller German States,” in Metternich’s 
own words.94 The phrases stately, prim, pleasure-loving, frivolous, 
and spend-thrift have all been used to describe the elder 
Metternich, and conjure images strikingly similar to those 
associated with the French aristocrats themselves on the eve of the 
Revolution. His amiable dismissiveness of revolutionary forces 
only completes the comparison. 95  Maria Beatrice, while hailing 
from the east of the imperial lands, helped enforce these French 
overtones. Profoundly ambitious, she piled her affections and 
attention onto young Clemens, raising him to become a master of 
“the art of pleasing,” the French language, and “the graces which 
the old society of France and the parts of Europe adjacent had 
brought to perfection.”96 He was the child upon which the family’s 
hopes were poured, and so he was to perfect the traits which had 
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brought his parents success. These are the very traits which 
brought him diplomatic success later in life. 
Certainly, surrounded as he was by Rhenish society, 
Metternich’s development as a charming aristocrat in the French 
style was to be expected. In 1773, the Elector and Archbishop of 
Trier, Clemens Wenzeslaus was both the uncle of King Louis XVI 
of France and the man for whom Metternich would be named. His 
appointment as archbishop was designed to solidify the new 
alliance between the French Bourbons and Austrian Habsburgs.97 
At this time, however, Trier was more commonly known by its 
French name of Treves—strongly telling of where the 
archbishopric leaned culturally. 98  “Cosmopolitanism,” states 
modern Rhineland expert Michael Rowe, “acted as an antidote to 
the stifling localism and bigotry” of the region,” where there was a 
craving for news on foreign improvements which might be applied 
locally,” where there was perhaps no more cosmopolitan state than 
nearby France. France’s influence was felt in numerous tangible 
fields, such as the adoption of French economic practices, social 
club structure, and political and social journals.99 The Rhineland 
thus served as a veritable melting pot of German and French 
influences, politically tied to Germany and the Habsburgs, but with 
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its heart held by France, a description which fits Metternich just as 
well as the region itself. That Metternich became such a staunch 
enemy to the Revolution is then entirely unsurprising, for the goals 
of the Revolution called for the destruction of this courtly culture 
which he had grown up with. One could ascribe Metternich’s 
philosophical development to a visceral self-defense of his way of 
life, and while that may be sufficient explanation if one is to 
assume that he was motivated entirely by personal reasons, it 
seems unable to completely account for the consistency of 
Metternich’s principles and the question of why they formed 
specifically as they did. To find the answer to that, one must turn 
to a new facet of Metternich’s early development: his education. 
Metternich’s education, while rarely commented on by the 
man himself, was incredibly diverse. Befitting his status as a 
nobleman in the Rhineland region, which boasted the highest 
literacy in Europe during the late eighteenth century and served as 
a center of the Catholic Enlightenment, he received comprehensive 
instruction from several tutors and leading universities.100 Among 
his tutors, whom Metternich pays special attention to in his 
Memoir, was Friedrich Simon, a disciple of the educators Johann 
Bernhard Basedow and Joachim Heinrich Cample, pioneers of the 
philanthropist school of education that was “in vogue” at the time 
of Metternich’s childhood. 101  Philanthropinism called for a 
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“natural” education, where children were to be engaged as children 
rather than small adults, with emphasis placed on the teaching of 
“natural” subjects, such as chemistry, natural science, history, and 
commerce.102 After joining Simon in his native city of Strasbourg 
in 1788, two years into his tutelage, Metternich’s education was 
supplemented by lectures from the city’s university.103 It is here 
that he received instruction from a man only recorded today as 
“Professor Koch,” a lecturer on German law who specialized in the 
study of the Treaty of Westphalia.104 Attendance at the University 
of Mainz105 later in his life brought him to study under Nicolas 
Vogt, the official historian of the Empire, who became one of 
Metternich’s “most zealous friends.” 106  In lectures inspired by 
philosophers such as Leibniz, Wolff, and Vattel, Vogt argued that 
the “greatest goal of a truly enlightened society is the education of 
all men as to the importance of the maintenance of [the] balance 
among both nations and individuals,” language later found in 
Metternich’s own ideas.107 The scientific studies Metternich likely 
received from Simon never left him: as late as 1796, Metternich 
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firmly believed that his “particular vocation seemed to me to be the 
cultivation of knowledge, especially of the exact and physical 
Sciences, which suited my taste particularly… The diplomatic 
career might certainly flatter my ambition, but during all my life I 
have never been accessible to this feeling.” “Man and his life 
seemed to me to be objects worthy of study,” he went on to write 
in reference to his diligent attendance of lectures on geology, 
chemistry, physics, and medicine in Vienna in 1797.108 
 These quotes, curiously, have gone almost completely 
ignored by Metternich’s biographers in English, despite the fact 
that they provide essential windows into the mindset he must have 
formed. The greatest scientist of the eighteenth century, of whom 
Metternich must have read, was Isaac Newton. Newton, even as an 
Englishman, dominated German scientific thinking in the 
eighteenth century.109 It was Newtonian physics which gave birth 
to Newtonian optimism, a staunchly conservative moral-scientific 
philosophy which supplanted mathematical rationality upon 
hypothetical realities, arguing that a logical and reasonable God 
had created a world which obeyed unbreakable logical rules. As 
such, the world was one which functioned in obedience of a natural 
order, with the most optimistic thinkers believing that as the 
creator God certainly obeyed the same rationality of the world he 
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created, then the world known had to be the best of all possible 
worlds.  A world which was not the best would be illogical to 
create, after all.110 This is the sort of thinking most often associated 
with the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz—a philosophical 
inspiration for Metternich’s friend and mentor, Professor Vogt. 
Koch, meanwhile, was a Westphalian expert. The Treaty of 
Westphalia was that which had created the concept of equality and 
sovereignty among nations, resolving the great European conflict 
of the seventeenth century which had been, in many ways, caused 
by both political and religious power imbalances within the Holy 
Roman Empire.111  
These are the factors which gave birth to Metternich’s 
substantive belief in the necessity of a balance of power. Historical 
evidence suggested that an imbalance would lead to war and 
ruination. The concept of states as solidified political entities fully 
in control of their own affairs made the idea of balancing them off 
each other that much more logical, as they could be understood as 
concrete units rather than the quasi-sovereign ones interconnected 
among a strange hierarchy previously active in the Holy Roman 
Empire. Philosophically and scientifically, as per the reasoning of 
the day, a natural order seemed to exist within the world which 
made it the best of all possible worlds: why then could the same 
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principle not be applied to the political world, where a balance of 
forces would bring about peace, and thus prosperity? Henry 
Kissinger himself admits to the Enlightenment connection of the 
balance of power philosophy in European politics, with that 
legendary Metternich expert von Srbik himself viewing Metternich 
as a “systematizer of the state and social order” who had an 
“exceedingly strong impulse to search beyond the phenomena of 
the mental and physical world for lawlike regularities and then in 
the factual realm to test them empirically and experimentally and 
prove them right.”112 Metternich and his career can thus be viewed, 
perhaps, as the last great hurrah of the proponents of natural social 
order, whose political goals stemmed from the desire to bring 
rational harmony to a disorderly world. 
Thus, Metternich was given the intellectual backing for his 
emotional opposition to revolution. The final question that must be 
asked, then, is what events codified his association between natural 
order, peace, and monarchy—and in the inverse, between 
revolution and chaos? The answer can be largely derived from his 
own mouth. In 1790, Metternich was present in Frankfurt for the 
coronation of Emperor Leopold II, which he would remember as 
“one of the most impressive and splendid spectacles in the world. 
Everything, down to the most trifling details, spoke to the mind 
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and heart through the force of tradition…” Comparing this to the 
reports of violence already pouring out of France, where revolution 
had broken out the year before, Metternich only saw “with all the 
force of youthful impressions, the contrast between the country 
contaminated by Jacobinism, and the country where human 
grandeur was united with a noble national spirit.” The contrast was 
set even deeper only two years later, at the coronation of Francis II, 
which Metternich also attended, when violence in France had 
escalated even further. By that time, war had been declared on 
Austria, with the violent excesses of the Reign of Terror just on the 
horizon.113 Shortly after, while curiously silent in regards to Louis 
XVI’s 1793 execution, the execution of Marie Antoinette later that 
year brought forth Metternich’s first political writing. In an open 
letter, he furiously condemned the action, angrily declaring to the 
Empire’s citizens that “the blood of your immortal [Maria] 
THERESA, the blood of AUSTRIA herself, [has been] spilled 
upon a scaffold!!!” “Ruin fall upon the heads of those impious 
murderers, murderers of their kings and of their Fatherland,” he 
further elaborated, with a measure more of self-control. 114 As a 
loyal servant of the Empire, whose parents and family had made 
their fortune in the service of the Habsburg emperors, and whose 
concept of tradition and order was firmly tied to imperial dignity, 
his anger was certainly justified.  
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Furthermore, the Revolution would not stay a distant 
enemy, for Metternich’s Rhineland lay directly within its path. 
From the outset of France’s troubles in 1789, aristocrats fleeting 
for their lives poured over the border into the empire’s 
principalities, establishing courts in exile in the Rhineland with a 
center at Coblenz—Metternich’s own home city. While tensions 
ran high between the French and local citizens, Metternich fully 
immersed himself within their society, proclaiming that he had 
“learned to estimate the difficulty of erecting a society on new 
foundations, when the old are destroyed,” from the exiles, likely 
only fully reinforcing his previously established aristocratically 
inclined sensibilities. 115  By 1792, Coblenz and the surrounding 
cities and towns116 also became the staging ground for the Prussian 
counterattack against French aggression. 117  From then on, the 
Revolution, in all its fury, consumed the major locations of 
Metternich’s youth. Strasbourg, where he had studied under the 
care of Simon and Koch, had already been plundered by 
revolutionary forces in 1789—an event he had been present to see. 
Mainz, where he had studied under Professor Vogt and which 
hosted, in Metternich’s words, the most luxurious court in all of 
Germany, fell in the opening months of 1793 after the Prussian 
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defeat at Valmy. 118  Mainz’s fall then meant that his education 
there was at an abrupt end, and so he traveled to Brussels, where 
his father served as imperial minister. There, he witnessed the 1793 
capturing of the French border city of Valenciennes by coalition 
troops. Though he would ultimately earn a reprieve from the chaos 
surrounding him with a visit to Great Britain on behest of his 
father’s government, he would not return to the Netherlands, for 
they too would fall in the revolutionaries’ counter-attack while he 
remained abroad – and with them fell Francis George’s political 
career.119 The worst was yet to come, however, and did in October 
of 1794 when revolutionary forces seized Coblenz itself, and with 
it, the Metternich family estate.120 And so the entire world which 
Metternich had known in his twenty-one years thus far was swept 
away by men who, in his mind, seemed intent on destroying both 
his society and his way of life. “I cannot bear the idea of seeing my 
home in the hands of those rogues,” he would write in a letter in 
December of that year. “According to my way of seeing things, 
everything has gone to the devil; and the time is come when 
everyone must save from the wreck what we can.”121 
With Coblenz and the Austrian Netherlands gone, the 
Metternich family moved to take up residence in Vienna as exiles 
– marking the first time he had actually seen the imperial capital. 
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And while it would be several years before his first permanent 
appointment as an official of the Austrian diplomatic service, 
Metternich’s philosophy and mindset was sealed. Here was a man 
who had grown up the model of a diplomatic and cosmopolitan 
aristocrat, surrounded by imperial traditions which served to 
uphold order within the world he knew, forced to bear direct 
witness to the violent overthrow of that entire system and the 
physical world that embodied it. Thus, while the intellectual 
origins of Metternich’s philosophy can be clearly traced to the 
influences of the men who educated him, it was the Revolution 
itself which defined them and gave them direction. The principle 
of the balance of power can be seen as the desire to restore natural 
order to the world, for the Revolution and its wars had thrown 
Europe out of balance, resulting in lawlessness, destruction, and 
chaos, which he bore witness to. Only a return to a political 
balance would allow for a return to order and lawfulness, in 
Metternich’s approximation. The principle of legitimacy was 
reflected in the same way, for with the overthrow of the French 
monarchy had come chaos, death, and war, while the staunchly-
imperial Holy Roman Empire remained a bastion of tranquility, as 
symbolized in its coronations. And the principle of conservatism is 
the insurance that none of this would ever happen again, for as 
long as the coronations occurred as they should, order would be 
maintained. Synthesizing all of this information, it becomes more 
surprising to entertain the thought that Metternich would not 
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become the diplomat that he did under these circumstances than to 
reflect upon the fact that a minor Rhenish noble such as he rose so 
high into the halls of history. 
While studying in Mainz, Professor Vogt gave Metternich a 
piece of advice which, by the man’s own admission, he would hold 
dear for the rest of his life. Almost prophetic in the image it 
conjures, one must wonder if Metternich remembered it 
apocryphally. Allegedly, Vogt told Metternich that: 
 
Your intellect and your heart on the 
right road; preserve therein also in 
practical life, the lessons of History 
will guide you. Your career, however 
long it may be, will not enable you to 
see the end of the conflagration 
which is destroying the great 
neighboring kingdom. If you do not 
wish to expose yourself to 
reproaches, never leave the straight 
path. You will see many so-called 
great men pass by you with swift 
strides; let them pass, but do not 
deviate from your path. You will 
overtake them, if only because you 
must meet them on their way 
back!122 
 
This is the image of Metternich that should be constructed as he 
moved out of his youth and into his professional career: that of a 
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man boldly walking forward, not deviating from his path even as 
great men passed him (Napoleon, perhaps), for soon enough he 
would be overtaking them. Metternich, as has been stated, was not 
a man who made up the rules as he went along in the political 
game. He knew who he was and what he believed in, and based his 
politics on such. His development as a politician is easily traceable 
by closely examining his early life. It is by recognizing this 
development and by learning just what this past was that one can 
come to see him as a very human figure. He was not one sinisterly 
bent on subjugating Europe, nor an immaculate genius, but rather a 
man who sought to restore and preserve a world that he firmly 
believed to be a good and natural one and that was, in his mind, 
completely opposed by the revolutionary movement. 
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Virtus and the Roman World: Generality, 
Specificity, and Fluidity 
By 
Kyle Schrader 
~      ~ 
 
I. Introduction 
 Scholars frequently debate the meanings of classical words 
that do not necessarily have direct modern language parallels. 
Words like the Greek othismos and the Latin virtus are poorly 
understood, and modern scholars strive to provide these words 
with specific definitions. The Romans saw their virtus, a term often 
inadequately translated as the English word “virtue,” as a major 
factor in their conquest of the Mediterranean. In this context, the 
Romans focused on their military virtus, a term that includes 
numerous intricacies of Roman combat ideology but can be 
simplified by the translation “martial courage.” However, the 
Romans also used virtus to describe men, women and objects off 
the battlefield, and in these cases virtus can also exhibit the 
adjectival qualities of the English word “excellence.” 
 These two uses of the term virtus are oversimplifications 
though. Donald Earl presented virtus as a word defining a 
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multitude of complex physical and moral ideas and practices.123 
While many more modern scholars oppose Earl’s view, it is clear 
that the term virtus does not necessarily define anything specific. 
Instead, the context gives virtus its meaning. The multitude of 
times virtus appears in the Latin lexicon, as well as the numerous 
different connotations and situations the word is found in, suggest 
a more broad usage of the term than modern scholars care to 
admit.124 From the literary sources available, three primary uses of 
virtus appear: a more general one meaning “excellence,” and two 
more specific meanings revolving around the battlefield and 
aristocratic competition in the Roman Republic. 
 
II. Virtus as a General Term  
Virtus was often used in military histories, accounts, and 
other such documents to describe a soldier or general’s actions on 
and recently off the battlefield. Virtus is also frequently found in 
poetry, theatre, and philosophical writings. One of the most famous 
of the non-military uses of the word virtus is in Cato’s De 
Agricultura, where Cato claims that the best land has natural 
virtus.125 Some scholars contribute this usage of virtus to Greek 
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influence over the Latin vocabulary. 126  If this was true, virtus 
should have lost, or at least changed, its original, more military 
meanings based on Greek influence as well, which, with evidence 
from later and contemporary military documents, is certainly not 
the case. Myles McDonnell, a modern proponent of the Greek-
influence theory, suggests that all uses of virtus in Roman plays are 
simply mis-translated versions of the Greek term for excellence, 
ἀῥἐῐᾐ. 127  Further, the other uses of virtus in this way (such as 
Cato’s usage in De Agricultura), according to McDonnell, can be 
attributed to a similar blending of the two different words that may 
have occurred during the Pyrrhic War.128 McDonnell uses these 
arguments to attempt to explain away these general uses of virtus, 
and yet, even if the linguistic blending did occur, these uses still 
existed. 
There is another possibility to explain these usages of 
virtus: perhaps these Roman writers were simply speaking 
metaphorically or with a sort of hyperbole. Classical scholars often 
see the word virtus and assume it is being used literally; in 
comedic theatre it is more likely the word would have been used 
ironically, and in other writings, such as Cato’s, the word virtus 
may have appeared so that a more general audience could 
understand the meaning. Ancient sources cannot always be 
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translated verbatim, no more than any modern languages can be 
translated fully into another language due to metaphors, 
euphemisms, idioms, and other cultural and linguistic tools. 
The Roman comedies of Plautus frequently use virtus in 
both military and non-military contexts. In Plautus’ Asinaria, a 
slave recounts his own virtus involved in his acceptance of his 
position in life, including his courage in enduring his master’s 
beatings.129 Modern scholars, such as Myles McDonnell, tend to 
argue that this instance is parody, and that a slave with virtus 
would have been a humorous concept to the Roman audiences of 
Plautus.130 However, the Romans themselves would have also seen 
the slave in question as exemplary, a slave who accepted his place 
under his master was preferred to one who rebelled or disdained 
his job. 131  In that context, virtus could be used to define an 
exemplary, or “excellent,” slave, and so maintain the general 
meaning of “excellence.” 
Another example of a somewhat odd usage of virtus comes 
from a later source: Cicero. While Plautus sometimes gave women 
the descriptor of virtus, Cicero is better known for describing his 
own wife’s virtus.132 Myles McDonnell mentions this instance as 
well, but simply glosses over it as a late Republican conception of 
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the word. Plautus’ use of virtus to describe clever women, as well 
as Cicero’s wife’s virtus of excellence and competence as a wife 
and mother, show a continuity of the usage of the word from the 
middle Republic to the late Republic in that specific context. 
Regardless of the linguistic origins of virtus being utilized 
in this general way, it appears frequently enough that the general 
meaning has to be a part of the overall definition of virtus. There 
are so many examples of land having virtus, women having virtus, 
slaves having virtus, and other non-Roman-male’s having virtus 
that a less specific meaning of virtus had to have existed in the 
Roman vernacular, and therefore in Roman writing. 
 
III. Battlefield Virtus 
 Jeremiah McCall, a modern scholar with an emphasis on 
the Roman aristocracy and military, claims that “virtus could only 
be demonstrated on the battlefield.” 133  While the term “only” 
certainly raises contention, the Romans did frequently use virtus 
used as a battlefield term. McCall discusses the role of the 
aristocratic cavalry in the army of the Republic and how each 
member of a cavalry unit was expected to exhibit virtus.134 This 
specific virtus included the ideals of martial courage, single 
combat, and other ideas based on one’s position on the battlefield 
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and Roman social hierarchy. 
 For the rank and file soldiers, virtus meant courage. These 
classical warriors may have believed courage was based on the 
ideals of “single combat,” or dueling, as J.E. Lendon argues.135 
These virtues would have been inherited from the classical stories 
in the Illiad and Odyssey, two Greek stories, along with older Latin 
tales. The Romans frequently translated and told the story of 
Othryades, the Spartan warrior who stayed on the battlefield even 
after all of his comrades had perished, and claimed victory as the 
two remaining Argive soldiers retreated to inform Argos of their 
victory.136 This story involved the champions of Sparta and Argos 
in combat with one another, with the Spartan Othryades continuing 
to fight and stay on the battlefield despite the loss of his unit and 
his own sustained wounds. This act of bravery would have inspired 
many Roman soldiers to emulate such acts in their own military 
careers. 
 Nathan Rosenstein takes the Greek connection further, 
arguing that, instead of emulating the Illiad, the Roman soldiers 
saw virtus as a code similar to the Spartan’s own military 
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tradition.137 This code included the sacred duty “not to flee” battle 
and to hold formation.138 Rosenstein suggests the Romans would 
have adopted this code from early experiences with the Greek city-
states in southern Italy, and to an even larger extent from 
emulation of Pyrrhus during the Pyrrhic War.139 This explanation 
of virtus would further explain why the story of Othryades was so 
popular among the Romans. The Roman manipular formation, 
however, leant itself far more to a mobile and flexible style of 
combat, meaning the rigid formation code of the Spartans would 
not have worked well when integrated into that battle formation. 
 Lendon extrapolates the single-combat aspect of virtus in 
soldiers to the formation the Romans adopted in the middle 
Republic.140 The traditional explanation for the Roman maniple is 
that they abandoned the phalanx in favor of a looser, more flexible 
formation in order to fight the Samnites and other peoples in Italy. 
Lendon, however, argues that the ideal of virtus, his definition 
focusing on single combat and competition, lent itself to a looser 
formation in which individual soldiers could have their duels with 
opposing soldiers.141 This is an interesting argument, and one that 
is not in conflict with the definition of Roman soldiers’ battlefield 
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virtus. Each individual soldier sought their own glory in their 
service to the Roman state, and the Roman maniple provided them 
an excellent outlet to show off their military prowess to their 
comrades, fostering competition and brotherhood as well.142 
 The aristocratic elements of the Roman army viewed virtus 
differently from their lower-class compatriots. Though single-
combat was also a major factor in their battlefield virtus, the 
aristocracy did this specifically because they wished to acquire 
spolia opima, or “noble spoils.”143 These spoils would be stripped 
off an enemy that they had slain, generally an aristocrat of the 
opposing side. In addition to the spolia opima, pure exhibitions of 
courage, such as putting oneself in more danger than the call of 
duty would require, could be rewarded with military accolades.144 
Either of these, the spolia opima or a military award, would launch 
an aristocrat’s political career forward, and enable them to begin 
the long ascension in political offices known as the cursus 
honorum.145 
 
IV. Virtus and the Aristocracy 
 A Roman aristocrat aspired to ascend to a political or 
military position wherein they would be awarded imperium, or the 
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right to command troops. These positions included the praetors, 
consuls and dictators, though the dictatorship was never actively 
sought by Republican aristocrats until the end of the Republic, as it 
only served as an emergency position. 146  In numerous Latin 
accounts from Livy, Cicero, Cato, and others, men who had 
obtained imperium via the cursus honorum automatically had 
virtus. Cicero specifically stated that a man with imperium had 
“singular virtus.”147 This commonality between accounts suggests 
that virtus was not necessarily a moral trait achieved by great men, 
but an omnipresent trait intrinsic in great men who obtained the 
highest powers and honors in Roman society. The specifics of this 
trait changed throughout Roman history on the basis of who the 
top men in the Republic were and how they achieved their 
victories on and off the battlefield. 
 Aristocratic males were born under their pater familias, the 
head of the family who was usually the oldest male, and were 
actually owned by him until either his death or their entrance into 
Roman public life. The aristocratic pater familias was generally a 
successful patrician, and often a senator who had done his military 
service and at least part of the cursus honorum to earn himself a 
seat in the Senate upon his retirement. A pater familias’s primary 
duty to their male children was to provide them education and an 
                                                          
146 Ibid., 25. 
147 M. Tullius Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, translated by C. 
D. Yonge (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden, 1856), 2. 
92 
 
entrance into public life; this training would have included military 
exercises and moral behavior lessons. The indoctrination of Roman 
patriotism and virtus began at a very young age.148 
 Once in the military, an aristocrat would either join the 
cavalry (if his family had a certain amount of wealth) or become 
captain for one of the infantry maniples. Once on the battlefield, 
the aristocrat could search for his single combat or great act of 
bravery to get himself noticed by their commanders and the 
Senate. Once the battlefield virtus had been established by 
achieving one of these two goals (or simply through longevity of 
decent military service), public office was assured for that 
aristocrat. 149  Often, high-status (born into more noteworthy 
families) aristocrats would skip a few of the early offices and go 
straight to quaestor, tribune or a local magistrate, offices not far 
away from major roles that held imperium. 
 When off the battlefield, an aristocrat could still display 
virtus. This more philosophical ideal of virtus included loyalty to 
the Roman state and “general excellence” as described previously. 
Competency in their role in public office, an accumulation of 
wealth, or even just a prestigious family name could contribute to 
the Senate’s consideration of an aristocrat’s virtus. Examples from 
later Roman literature display these trends; such as Cicero’s claims 
that Cato had virtus more for his public and administrative deeds 
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than for his military successes. 150  Likewise, even later 
commentators, such as Seneca, claimed that Cicero should be 
commended for having superior virtus, though he had no military 
successes to speak of.151 
 
V. Virtus and Imperium 
 Eventually the Roman aristocrat would achieve a 
successful military career, a productive decade in public offices, 
become a praetor, consul or dictator, and receive the Roman power 
of imperium. Once imperium was achieved, the definition of virtus 
in such a man with imperium changed immensely. In fact, the 
meaning of virtus itself changed frequently depending on the man 
with imperium and his degree of success. From roughly 390 BC to 
the Punic Wars, the Romans preferred an offensive foreign policy 
due to a national paranoia that took hold after the Gallic sack of 
Rome in 390 BC.152 
 The case of the Dictator Fabius Maximus perhaps best 
exemplifies this view of virtus. During the Second Punic War, 
Hannibal of Carthage invaded the Italian peninsula and managed to 
penetrate deep into the Roman lands of Latium, Campania, 
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Samnium, and other southern Italian regions.153 The Romans sent 
out their consuls and praetors, the first line of Republican military 
defenses, and their armies in an attempt to stop Hannibal from 
burning the Italian countryside. These consuls and praetors acted 
with the standard meaning of virtus during the time: aggressive 
attacking strategies, despite tactical disadvantages and numerical 
inferiority.154 Their rash actions, done in an attempt to prove their 
virtus, led to the disastrous battle at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC.155 
 Lake Trasimene represented one of the most catastrophic 
defeats in Roman history up to that point. The Roman Consul 
Flaminius went up against Hannibal’s forces with a small consular 
army when Hannibal invaded Etruria in 217. Hannibal knew that 
the Roman generals were culturally expected to act aggressively, 
and so he moved his army around the fortified Roman position and 
instigated a fight south of Flaminius’ favored ground.156 Flaminius, 
attempting to avoid looking like a coward, advanced quickly to 
meet Hannibal’s numerically superior forces, at an area around 
Lake Trasimene. As Flaminius advanced, “No sort of 
reconnaissance” was performed, according to Livy, which was an 
unnecessarily risky maneuver.157 Flaminius was overconfident in 
his presumed victory, and a poorly calculated attack (if successful) 
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would not only greatly boost his political career and reputation, but 
would also display his virtus as well. 
 Unfortunately, Hannibal expected the Roman consul to act 
in an overly aggressive and rash manner. His army had hidden in 
wait on the hillside, and when the Romans marched past, he 
signaled his troops to attack. Livy describes the outcome best: 
“Down they came from the hills, each many by the nearest way, 
taking the Romans totally unprepared.”158 This battle resulted in 
the entirety of the consular army being enslaved, killed, or 
otherwise disbanded, as well as the death of consul Flaminius 
himself.159 
 In response to this catastrophic loss, the Roman Senate 
elected Fabius Maximus as Dictator. With a dictator in charge, all 
other positions that normally held imperium, such as the praetors 
and consuls, had to give their armies over to the dictator, who had 
supreme military control. Fabius had previously held the 
consulship three times, and had military prestige from his victories 
over the Ligurians in the 230s. 160  The situation that Fabius 
presided over was very bleak. Roman morale was low due to 
repeated defeats and Carthaginian ravaging of the countryside, and 
his armies were incredibly fearful of engagement with the ever-
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victorious Hannibal.161 
 In order to raise his soldiers’ morale, Fabius chose a new 
strategy in waging the war. Instead of following Hannibal and 
attempting a direct confrontation, he chose merely to shadow 
Hannibal and perform minor assaults on the Carthaginian baggage 
train and light infantry. Polybius claims Fabius wished to “incur no 
danger and not to risk a battle, but to make the safety of his men 
his first and greatest object.”162 For a few months, this strategy 
worked quite well. The morale of both the army and the Senate 
rose quickly while under Fabius’ leadership.163 
 Unfortunately, while the Romans suffered no major defeats 
with Fabius’ strategy, the Senate and Fabius’ subordinates did not 
see any massive victories either. The Master of Horse, Fabius’ 
second in command named Minucius, believed that Fabius had 
become too timid, and so he began leading small bands of troops 
into direct conflict with Hannibal’s army. Minucius, according to 
Livy, established the meaning of virtus as it pertained to him and 
the Senate: “Rome’s power grew by action and daring – not by 
these do-nothing tactics, which the faint-hearted call caution.”164 
 In conjunction with Minucius’ denouncement of Fabius, the 
Senate and army showed their displeasure as well. While the 
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Senate merely berated Fabius, his army was highly mutinous and 
did not follow Fabius’ orders.165 In fact, it seemed that “Had the 
matter been put to a general vote, there is little doubt that the army 
would have declared a preference to serve under Minucius rather 
than Fabius.”166 Fabius was seen as cowardly precisely because he 
was attempting to protect his army from destruction, rather than 
aggressively pursuing the enemy as previous generations had done 
to grow “Rome’s power.”167 
 As a result, when Fabius’ term as dictator ended, he was 
not asked to return in any form to an office with imperium, and he 
retired in relative disgrace compared to how most at least partially-
successful generals did. 168  Immediately after, two new consuls 
were assigned to lead the Roman armies in a more aggressive 
strike at Hannibal. The Battle of Cannae occurred, resulting in the 
total annihilation of the Roman military yet again.169 The Senate 
received their wish of two imperium-wielding generals that 
exhibited the aggressive aspects of virtus, and their reward was 
another catastrophic loss. 
VI. A Fluid Virtus 
 The Roman army had been defeated handily at Lake 
Trasimene and Cannae. Further defeats, caused by the aggressive 
                                                          
165 Ibid., Book XXII, section 14, 109. 
166 Livy, The War With Hannibal, Book XXII, section 15, 111. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts, 202. 
169 Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 197. 
98 
 
and rash decisions of Roman generals wishing to prove their virtus, 
were still to come. Eventually, though, the Senate learned its 
lesson. Fabius Maximus was brought out of retirement, and 
entrusted with the task of keeping Rome’s morale high, as well as 
orchestrating any necessary defense of the city. 170  For the 
remainder of the conflict with Hannibal, a more cautious strategy 
was allowed, and even the Roman soldiers accepted such 
leadership without mutiny. Fabius himself gained “the reputation 
of an outstanding commander” and was loved by his 
contemporaries as well as future Romans.171 
 This shift represented a large change in Roman military 
culture. Up to the time of Fabius, preemptive strike and an 
aggressive military stance had been the normal mode of virtus for 
Roman generals. 172  Modern scholars, such as Lendon and 
McDonnell, contend that the aggressive virtus continued full-force 
past this point, all the way up to Augustus and the tragedy with 
Varus and his legions along the Rhine. 173  The Senate and 
aristocratic conceptions of virtus, however, seem to have been 
more pragmatic than that. 
 Not only was the Senate willing to allow a massive shift in 
military policy after the relative success of Fabius’ strategy, future 
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strategic decisions of its like were also allowed. 174  The Senate 
praised future generals, not only for their aggressiveness if they 
had that trait, but also for their shrewd cunning in achieving 
victory. Frontinus remarks that the Senate “turned back to Fabius 
and his strategy” numerous times after the Punic Wars.175 
 By the time of the early Principate, there was certainly 
admiration for generals who used more strategic means to achieve 
victory. Livy claims that Fabius used “wise delaying tactics” and 
further criticized the Senate and soldiers under Fabius for having 
ever held “contempt” for their commander.176 Suetonius, a Roman 
biographer of the middle Principate, credited Augustus with 
saying, “a cautious general is better than a bold one.”177 While 
Suetonius’ comment would not necessarily represent what was 
thought during the early Principate/Late Republic, it at least shows 
that by the time of the second century A.D. there was a significant 
cultural shift in seeing virtus more as a path to victory, regardless 
of exactly which path is taken, rather than a specific virtue. 
 The alternative view of many scholars focused on the 
rigidly aggressive and martial courage definitions of virtus, such as 
McDonnell, is that, by the time of the Principate, virtus had lost 
most of its original meaning due to Greek influences and 
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Augustus’ redefinitions of certain Roman cultural terms in order to 
benefit himself.178 This argument, however valid in explaining the 
imperial definitions of virtus, does not explain the Senate’s 
willingness to allow and actively promote the use of non-
aggressive tactics and strategies in the wake of the Second Punic 
War. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Myles McDonnell finishes his book, Roman Manliness: 
Virtus and the Roman Republic, with a short section on virtus in 
the Principate. In this section, he claims that the Romans of this 
period “could use both the martial and ethical meanings of virtus 
frequently and naturally.”179 By this time, virtus was a descriptor 
given to those who achieved success in any major part of Roman 
society, whether economic, political, military, or even religious.180 
McDonnell argues that this change happened swiftly, with 
Augustus having instituted most of the changes to the word virtus 
and its public perception between the end of the Republic and the 
first century AD.181 McDonnell also argues, earlier in the book, 
that men such as Cicero (from the late Republic) believed that 
virtus was the main quality “responsible for Roman greatness,” and 
that this quality had aspects in the military, political, and economic 
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sections of Roman society.182 
 By the very nature of McDonnell’s argument and Cicero’s 
belief that virtus was how the Romans expanded their control over 
the Mediterranean, virtus had no single, static meaning. The 
Romans had not extended their territorial empire across the 
Mediterranean world simply through aggression and martial 
courage, but with a myriad of resources including diplomacy, 
wealth, and adept leadership. In fact, from the view of Cicero, 
virtus may as well have been defined simply as “Roman 
greatness.”183 
 Modern scholars’ attempts to define virtus as a strictly 
military word, and, worse, as a strictly military word with only a 
single military definition, come from a modern wish to translate 
words into easy, exact definitions. In order to translate virtus, 
however, the context the word is used in ends up far more 
important than the word itself. Roman generals had virtus in the 
early Republic due to their aggressive tactics that their enemies 
simply could not handle. During the latter years of the Second 
Punic War, Fabius had virtus due to his successful policy of 
cautious, periodic combat. Cato’s land had virtus, because a good 
harvest could come from its dirt. Plautus’ slaves had virtus, 
because they embodied the ideal Roman slave. 
 Virtus defined those who attained victory and success. It 
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was not that one man had distinct “martial courage,” and hence had 
virtus, because those who exhibited such a virtue and died had no 
virtus, such as those consuls who recklessly lost their own lives 
and those of their men at Lake Trasimene and Cannae. There was a 
definition of virtus that was popular among the lower classes, as 
exemplified by Fabius’ mutinous soldiers who wanted only an 
aggressive general such as Minucius, but this definition was just as 
fluid as the more generalized usage used at the higher levels of 
Roman society. The ideas of the aristocracy seem to have trickled 
down to the lower classes, as mutinies became less common over 
the years and there seems to have been a general acceptance that 
the general’s orders were to be followed regardless of moral issues 
surrounding aggression and virtus.184 
 McDonnell’s argument about the homogenization of the 
term virtus during the Principate is certainly valid. The 
homogenized use of virtus, however, had existed for much longer 
than that. And before the homogenization of usage of the word, 
which can be dated to the late Republican writers, the term itself 
was fluid with its meaning. From defining the fertility of land to 
the excellence of slaves to the martial courage of soldiers, virtus 
was the primary word the Romans used to describe anything they 
found to be successful or generally positive. If sources existed in a 
more vernacular version of Latin, it is likely that virtus may have 
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even shown up as a more or less synonym of the modern English 
word “successful.” Unfortunately, without such a source to 
analyze, the numerous shifting usages of virtus in the Latin lexicon 
leave the scholar with only one real conclusion: virtus represented 
“Roman excellence,” and had no single translation at any one time 
in Roman history. 
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The Desperate Rebels of Shimabara: 
The Economic and Political Persecutions 
and the Tradition of Peasant Revolt 
By 
Jake Farias  
~      ~ 
 
The Shimabara Rebellion from 1637 to 1638 remains one 
of the most historically divisive events in Japanese early modern 
history.  The Rebellion threw the Shimabara and Amakusa 
provinces on the far south of Japanese islands into outright revolt 
against their lords, and, later, against the army of the shogunate 
itself.  The cause of the Rebellion remains a popular 
historiographical debate into the modern day.  Some contend that 
the sizeable, if still minority, population of Japanese Christians in 
these distant provinces revolted in order to overthrow a 
government whose public policy included the persecution, torture, 
and execution of Christians.  Others argue that economic 
oppression forced the peasants into revolt against irresponsible 
daimyo, or local lords, with the Christian element being 
overplayed in historical records.  Neither of these interpretations 
fully captures the nature of the Shimabara Rebellion.  Tokugawa 
Japan, even after the Rebellion, maintained a long tradition of 
peasant resistance to the domination by the daimyo through 
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petitions, inactivity, and even outright violence.  Economic 
hardship and political persecution undoubtedly pressured peasants 
into rebellion against their lords in Shimabara and Amakusa.  
However, Christian influences in these regions tied together the 
revolt of farmers, unemployed soldiers, and other classes.  The 
Shimabara Rebellion was not a peasants’ revolt against unjust 
taxation or a Christian uprising.  The Rebellion was the last 
measure of a desperate people, pushed together by a common 
economic suffering and held together by a common culture 
marked, but not consumed, by Japanese Christianity.  After the 
Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate’s persecution of Christianity 
was a concentrated effort to cut or replace these cultural and 
religious ties in order to end the threat of any future powerful and 
unified revolts.  The shogunate’s reaction reveals how they 
recognized the multiple causes of the Rebellion and used the 
experience to prevent future insurrections. 
In order to properly understand how the Shimabara arose, 
historians must be aware not just of the economic and religious 
environment, but also of the common practices of the peasant 
class.  Although the Tokugawa era was characterized by 
administrative and government domination, the chonin, or middle 
to lower classes, still maintained some ability to resist unilateral 
domination by their daimyo.  Peasants eventually submitted to 
social immobility and high taxes from their lords; however, they 
were still able to influence local policy.  Often, in instances of bad 
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farming or famine, peasants requested exemption or lowering of 
the tax rate.185 While the daimyo had no legal obligation to act on 
these peasant demands, their acceptance hinted at a local 
relationship more flexible than the national tax-collecting policy.  
Despite the heavy cost demands of the upkeep of estate, personal 
castle, and lavish lifestyle, daimyo were more willing to negotiate 
with peasants than to risk a costly revolt.  Often these appeals were 
conducted through village headmen and the wealthy farming 
families who sought to retain a greater amount of surplus crop.186  
However, increased tax burdens most heavily affected the poorer 
farming families, who could be driven to starvation in years of bad 
harvest.  As a result, some of these poor farmers threatened to 
abandon their land, leaving the domain’s agricultural base without 
its primary labor force.  In the pursuit for concessions, the 
headsman used typical honorifics and appeals to their “benevolent 
lordship,” laced with dissatisfaction over the lord’s administration.  
In extreme cases, peasant classes chanced open revolt when their 
daimyo ignored petitions and refused any concessions.  Only 
twenty years after the bloody Shimabara Rebellion, peasants under 
the Kurume administration in southern Japan violently revolted 
when their lord refused to lower “unheard of taxes” and every 
                                                          
185 Donald Burton, “Peasant Movements in Early Tokugawa Japan,” Peasant 
Studies, 8, no. 3 (Summer 1979), accessed February 20, 2015, 62.  Historical 
Abstracts. 
186 Ibid., 65. 
112 
 
demand by the peasants.187 
As a result, typically the daimyo and the shogunate opted to 
appease the peasant population instead of having to crush outright 
rebellion.188  Daimyo that lost control over their peasant population 
were often replaced and dishonored by their administrative failure.  
Through this policy of mutual responsibility, the chief concerns of 
the daimyo shifted from collecting as much as possible from the 
peasant population to maintaining peace and order in their domain.  
Although the exploitation of peasants through poll taxes, 
agricultural taxes, and more continued, daimyo made concessions 
and tax breaks to avoid the humiliation of a revolt.  The complicity 
of the law was better assured when the peasants respected their 
lord and believed they would receive fair treatment.  For example, 
even after the brutally repressed Shimabara Rebellion, peasants hid 
their rice from tax collectors in Bizan.189  Efficient tax collection 
was easier and better guaranteed through appeasement, not force.  
Tokugawa era daimyo exploited the peasantry, but the peasantry 
retained an agency to defy absolute domination. 
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Many historians have discussed the Shimabara Rebellion in 
detail, primarily focusing on the causes of the revolt.  Older 
research tended to place the blame on the harsh anti-Christian 
policies enacted by the daimyo.  Neil Fujita and Joseph Sebes both 
attributed the rebellion as an outburst of persecuted Japanese 
Christians, joined by hidden Christians who had been “forced to 
apostatize” through torture and intimidation. 190   Japanese 
Christians were a significant minority in southern Japan.  
Originally, daimyo had forced their peasantry to convert to 
Christianity in order to attract European ships and the goods they 
carried, particularly guns.  Although the demand for guns 
significantly lessened once the Tokugawa shogunate stiffened its 
control over the nation, many of the peasants remained committed 
to their newfound religion.  Reports of the Rebellion, from 
European and Japanese sources, detailed the rebels’ use of 
Christian symbols and banners.  However, Fujita and Sebes’ theory 
relied on a much larger population of Japanese Christians than 
actually existed in Kyushu.  More realistically, modern historians 
relied on the tradition and accounts of peasant rebellions to explain 
the Rebellion. 191   Using research by historians such as Donald 
Burton and Geoffrey Parker, more recent narratives explained the 
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Shimabara Rebellion as a peasants’ revolt against political injustice 
and unbearable taxation.  Geoffrey Gunn explicitly described this 
version of events as “refreshingly modern.”192  However, to simply 
disregard the well-documented Christian element of the Rebellion 
does not fully explore the origins of the Shimabara Rebellion, nor 
explain the harsh reprisals against Christianity following the 
Rebellion. 193   Recently, more historians have rejected both the 
Christian uprising and peasant revolt narratives, entertaining the 
idea that both elements substantially influenced the Rebellion.  
Ohashi Yukihiro, a younger and newer historian, even explored 
how the opposing narratives of the Shimabara Rebellion were 
developed by historians after concluding that multiple elements of 
social hierarchy and cohesion, religious persecution, and economic 
despotism made the Rebellion possible.  Ultimately, historians 
have increasingly accepted that there is no singular cause, and have 
begun to explore how the memory of the Shimabara Rebellion was 
created to simplify the historical narrative and foist the blame for 
civil unrest on the small minority of Japanese Christians. 
 In Shimabara and Amakusa, economic pressures were so 
dire as to require these methods of resistance.  Many peasants 
complained of heavy taxes and of difficulty living.  Wealthier 
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farmers could not retain as much surplus and poor farmers risked 
starvation under the new Shimabara lord.194  The previous lord, 
who had also burdened the population with persecution of 
Christianity and heavy taxes, had died suddenly, leaving his 
inexperienced son to continue his unpopular policies.  Peasants in 
Amakusa suffered similarly and this heavy economic oppression 
irked many of the farmers, both wealthy and poor. 195   Duarte 
Correa, a Portuguese sea captain-turned-Jesuit, recorded that the 
peasants of Amakusa were forced to pay the annual tribute in 
wheat, rice, and barley as well as two additional imposts.  
Furthermore, Correa asserted that the peasantry was expected to 
serve the daimyo in every way possible, such as supplying 
firewood to their lord’s soldiers.196  While Correa’s testimony is 
steeped in bias, as a secret Catholic missionary, these claims 
leveled against the lords of Shimabara and Amakusa are supported 
by their inexperience and youth. 197   Additionally, extravagant 
spending by the daimyo was typically expected, from the expenses 
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of sankin kotai to the costs of maintain their castle, dress, and other 
status symbols.198  Being inexperienced daimyo, these two lords 
may have been overwhelmed by their administrative and social 
duties and resorted to raising taxes to procure the appropriate 
funds.  However, through the eyes of the peasants, these daimyo 
openly exploited their peasant class in order to enhance their own 
personal wealth.  Most accounts claim that the Shimabara lord 
used most of the collected taxes in order to fund the building of his 
new Shimabara castle at the expense of the farming class.  
Furthermore, the lords punctuated these economic injustices with 
acts of political terror and torture.  Peasants unable to supply taxes 
were beaten, drowned, and killed on the administration’s orders.199  
These economic and political abuses created a highly volatile 
sentiment among the commoner classes, especially the farmers. 
 These economic and political injustices were compounded 
by the religious persecution enacted by both the state and local 
governments.  Since Toyotomi Hideoyoshi’s reign, the government 
had, at least on paper, opposed the expansion and continued 
presence of Christianity in Japan.  In 1587, Hideyoshi declared that 
any lord who wanted to become a “follower of the padres (priests)” 
of their own volition could do so and also convert their fief, only 
                                                          
198 Sankin kotai is the law of necessary expeditions to and prolonged stays at the 
shogunate’s castle in Edo.  The daimyo were expected to make this trip at least 
annually and maintain an impressive home worthy of their title.  The intention of 
sankin kotai was to keep daimyo from building too much personal wealth and to 
bring them close under the watchful eye of the shogunate. 
199 Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 74. 
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prohibiting some of the wealthier and more influential fief owners 
from doing so. 200   However, in the same year, Hideyoshi also 
expelled the missionaries from Japan and denounced his vassals 
who had convinced the peasants of their fief to convert as well.201  
Christianity had first arrived in southern Japan in the mid 1500’s, 
brought in force by Portuguese missionaries and later by Christian 
Dutch and British merchant companies.  As evidenced in Samurai 
William, these Southern lords employed a number of methods to 
attract European trading company ships.202  Acting independently 
of the daimyo, some lords converted to Christianity to attract the 
European merchants to their cities, or at least provided Christian 
missionaries with access to the countryside and peasant population.  
Some peasants converted upon their lord’s conversion to 
Christianity while others were convinced by the preaching of the 
Christian priests.  Japanese Christians never became a majority in 
southern Japan, but did account for a sizeable minority of the 
population. 
Although Christianity was still, to some extent, prevalent in 
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201 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, “Expulsion of the Missionaries, 1587,” in Japan: A 
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202 Giles Milton, Samurai William (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2002), 182. 
In the case of the British East India Company, King Foyne of Hirado 
demonstrated his hospitality in the form of food and prostitutes provided for the 
crew of the Clove.  King Foyne won over the British East India Company and 
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Kyushu in the early 1600’s under the first Tokugawa shogun, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, the succeeding shoguns harshly condemned the 
foreign religion. 203   During the early Tokugawa shogunate, 
Christianity experienced a “dramatic decline,” likely due to the 
shogunate’s increasing alienation and restriction of European 
influences during the Edo period.204  Christianity was only truly 
valued for the trade, specifically guns, it brought in from European 
merchants; with the pacification of Japan under Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
there was a decreased demand for guns and a significant decreased 
value on trade with the European Christians.  Christian faith was 
considered a crime.  This policy was not entirely unique to 
Christianity, as unpopular Buddhist sects and families of disloyal 
retainers received similar treatment.  Regardless, hundreds of 
Christians were executed in Kyoto in 1619 and in Nagasaki in 
1622.205  Records of Christians being imprisoned, decapitated, and 
burned alive characterized the shogunate’s attitude towards 
Japanese Christians. 206  Even more graphic executions included 
crucifixion, water torture, mutilation, and “suspending the prisoner 
head down over a pit of excrement.”  Many of the Japanese 
Christians recanted to avoid punishment while others were driven 
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into underground groups.207  The Tokugawa bakufu’s desire for 
control, stability, and order compelled it to attempt to quash 
Christianity.208  The Era of the Warring States, characterized by 
near constant civil war across Japan by competing warlords, was 
over and there was no longer any need for trade with the 
Europeans.  To emphasize the point, two years before the 
Shimabara Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate issued an edict 
barring the Catholic priests from Japan, demanding that its 
citizenry report any found padres, and promised to put to death any 
Japanese returning from overseas.209  Christianity had outstayed its 
welcome in Tokugawa Japan, as the bakufu sought to consolidate 
its control over its population’s personal and religious lives.  Zen 
Buddhism was becoming a national religion used to encourage 
loyalty and subservience among the peasantry and to reinforce 
Tokugawa authority instead of opposing it.210  In the eyes of the 
shogunate, Christianity had outlived its usefulness and had become 
a cause of disorder in the religious conflict it provoked. 
 At the local level, the Shimabara and Amakusa lords 
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engaged in the persecution of Christians in the same manner as the 
shogunate.  This process was very common in domains formerly 
controlled by Christian daimyo.211  In a later letter to shogunate 
forces, one rebel claimed that their only wish was to practice 
Christianity without repression.212  Although this demand was not 
universal for the Shimabara rebels, a significant percentage of 
Japanese Christians lived in constant fear of being arrested and 
executed for their religion.  The Shimabara and Amakusa 
repressions of Christianity worsened an already toxic relationship 
between the daimyo and their peasants. 
 This common suffering of the Shimabara and Amakusa 
peasants, both Christians and non-Christians, was pushed to a 
breaking point by 1637 CE.  The peasants of Shimabara revolted, 
attacking the lord’s tax officials and men.  The peasants, 
merchants, craftsmen, and unemployed soldiers of Amakusa 
followed, as joined the rebellion out of choice or force.  These 
rebels converged on Hara Castle to reform and organize, 
appointing the 16-year old Amakusa Shiro as their “leader.” 213  
                                                          
211 While many Southern lords had converted their fiefs to Christianity to garner 
European trade, many were replaced or forced out by the Tokugawa bakufu.  
The later non-Christian daimyo, eager to prove their loyalty to the Tokugawa 
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212 Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 74. 
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success of the rebellion imply that more experienced warriors planned the 
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Hara Castle was besieged by Tokugawa forces but their initial 
attempts to crush the rebels failed.  After almost four months, the 
Tokugawa forces starved the rebels of food, resources, and 
ammunition.  Hara Castle fell and the Tokugawa forces 
exterminated almost all of the participating rebels.  After the 
massacre, the shogunate issued edicts expelling and banning all 
Europeans, except for the Dutch at Nagasaki, and reinforcing the 
outlaw of Christianity in Japan.  After the Rebellion, Christianity 
was affixed with a permanent stigma of violence, disorder, and 
disrespect for proper authority.  The Tokugawa shogunate issued 
propaganda portraying Christianity as impure and inappropriate 
while also promising rewards to those who reported Christian 
practitioners.214  Japanese Christians were forced underground to 
hide their religion and the Tokugawa shogunate eliminated 
Japanese Christianity as what they perceived as a threat. 
 Although historians like Fujita or Gunn argue whether 
economic or religious oppression was more significant in pushing 
the Tokugawa peasantry to revolt, the Rebellion was much more 
complicated.  The communities of Shimabara and Amakusa were 
tightly knit, tied together by a common culture.  Christianity had 
its largest base for support in southern Japan, and Japanese 
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Christians made up a significant percentage of the population.  
Although public acts of torture and execution were intended to 
horrify and scare the populace into submission, at the time, local 
daimyo could only safely employ it in moderation.  By overusing 
these methods, the daimyo pushed the population past the breaking 
point, to where they were convinced that they were more safe 
revolting than continuing under the daimyo’s rule.  Japanese 
Christians and non-Christian peasants were tied together by the 
communal need to survive.  In times of famine or bad harvests, the 
village headmen, regardless of their religion, campaigned for lower 
tax rates, tax breaks, and exemptions.  Regardless of their 
differences in religion, wealth, or social status, the peasantry pulled 
together in times of extreme despotism with the intention of 
forcing improvement in their standard of living.  In their struggle 
to survive, the agricultural base had created a community that 
relied on each other to demand concessions from the state 
authority. 
 Additionally, although only Christians were being 
persecuted for religious reasons, every member of the commoner 
class was being exploited economically and oppressed politically.  
In an effort to both help fund the reconstruction of Edo’s walls and 
to build his own Shimabara Castle, Shigemasa Matsukura, the new 
lord, imposed heavy taxes and developed strict penalties for the 
farmers who failed to provide.  Many of these taxes seem almost 
ridiculous to modern thinking, such as taxes for the death of a 
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family member.  Families unable to pay their taxes were starved, 
beaten, tortured, or killed.  The mothers and daughters of these 
families were sold into brothels.  Concessions were not 
forthcoming.215  The economic and political oppression unified the 
peasantry into a culture of suffering, one in which mutual 
dependence was essential. 
 Economic grievances played a significant role in the start 
of the Rebellion.  The unbearable taxes and system of punishments 
pushed the peasantry to desperate measures.  As the lifestyle 
became more and more untenable, the peasants turned to their own 
and implemented the only option left available to resist: open 
rebellion.  At its very least, revolt attracted the attention, and 
displeasure, of the shogunate.  In some ways, the peasant revolt 
can be interpreted as a Pyrrhic victory, mutually assured 
destruction for both the rebels and the daimyo.  In previous cases, 
daimyo were dishonored and removed from office as punishment 
for failing to maintain peace in their domain.  Political and 
economic despotism forced peasants to drastic actions.  The close 
bonds between the community, strengthened by a common culture 
and common “suffering,” assured that the rebels organized, 
mobilized, and, largely remained loyal to each other. 
 The Shimabara Rebellion was an incredibly costly 
challenge to Tokugawa authority.  The rebels raided armories, 
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killed Tokugawa soldiers, and forced a lengthy siege.  More 
importantly, the Rebellion embarrassed the bakufu; although the 
peasantry was incited against their daimyo, these commoners-in-
arms managed to occupy a castle, repulse, and kill trained 
military.216  In short, the Shimabara Rebellion was not a mistake 
the shogunate could allow to happen again.  To prevent another 
uprising of the similar nature, the Tokugawa shogunate devoted 
itself to the expulsion and elimination of Christianity in the 
domains.  By foisting the blame on the Japanese Christians, the 
shogunate could divide the communities in southern Japan where 
Christians were still a significant minority. 
 The Tokugawa shogunate employed a more developed and 
systematic persecution of Christians.  Propaganda was specifically 
designed to demonize the European Christian missionaries.  In one 
chapbook, the Christian “padre” is described more like a goblin 
than human, with the intention of taking over Japan. 217  These 
depictions were intended to scare Japanese away from interaction 
with Christianity and to create a connotation between Christianity 
and evil.  However, this propaganda piece also did much more.  
The Buddhist monk ultimately prevents the spread of the priest’s 
“screeching,” juxtaposing the wild and uncivilized image of the 
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Christian padre with the calm wisdom and loyalty of the Buddhist 
monk.  By denigrating Christianity, this excerpt elevates Zen 
Buddhism which was quickly becoming the Tokugawa’s influence 
on religion.  Kirishitan also legitimized the reprisals of the 
shogunate against Christianity; in this text, the shogun has the 
moral right to destroy their temples and punish those that remain 
Christian. 218  The shogunate certainly exercised this right more 
frequently and publicly after the rebellion.  While the previous 
executions had been sporadic and scattered, the shogunate 
enforced stricter laws ordering the population to report Japanese 
Christians.  One set of Household Laws from 1640 includes 
numerous charges to investigate and report any Christian activities.  
All villagers were also required to report to the “pertinent temple,” 
as Zen Buddhist temples took over the responsibility of ensuring 
the Tokugawa shogunate’s control over its citizens’ religions.  
Tokugawa officials assumed these laws would be followed, 
because if Christians were discovered by these officials, the entire 
village would be punished.219  One edict ordered by the Tokugawa 
senior counselors in 1639 captures the spirit of this policy: 
 
With regard to those who believe in 
Christianity, you are aware that there 
is a proscription, and thus knowing, 
you are not permitted to allow padres 
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and those who believe in their 
teachings to come aboard your ships.  
If there is any violation, all of you 
who are aboard will be considered 
culpable.  If there is anyone who 
hides the fact that he is a Christian 
and boards your ship, you may report 
it to us.  A substantial reward will be 
given to you for this information.220 
 
This memorandum was addressed to Chinese and Dutch ships.  
The bakufu clarified that foreigners could be Christian as long as 
they did not propagate. However, this edict demonstrates the 
bakufu’s main tool in rooting out Christianity was not officials or 
even Buddhist temples but the civilian population itself.  The threat 
of punishment for failing to report Christians compelled the non-
Christian population to take an active role in searching out 
Christians within their own village or town.  The promise of 
reward made compliance even more appealing. 
The concept that everyone would suffer for the religious 
beliefs on one individual drove a wedge between Japanese 
Christians and non-Christians.  These Group Laws, and the 
promised reprisals for disobeying them, severed the cultural ties 
and communal spirit that had united the Shimabara and Amakusa 
peasants regardless of religion.  With these laws, commoners had 
to fear their neighbor, not support them.  Edicts like these helped 
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the Tokugawa government root out Christianity−and prevent the 
disorder it could create−but also cut any ties of trust or fellowship 
that could unite peasant families in a revolt. 
 However, the Tokugawa shogunate also understood the role 
corrupt and incompetent daimyo played in inciting the Shimabara 
Rebellion.  Both Matsukura and Katataka were instructed to end 
their lives in penance for failing to keep the peace.  Future daimyo 
were more incentivized to treat their peasants well, rather than risk 
the humiliation of a revolt. 221   In this way, the shogunate 
discouraged corruption and injustice, based on its risks of agitating 
the populace and creating the necessary dissatisfaction for a revolt.  
Although Group Laws kept villages divided and fearful of one 
another, too much economic and political despotism would still 
drive the peasantry together.  As one abbot Kodo told the lord of 
Kurume, cornered rats will even “bite the cat when driven to 
extremity.”222  Kodo’s statement, whether an invention of memory 
or true, shows that the Tokugawa understand why peasants revolt 
and seek to crush the causes for their discontent in addition to their 
means to stage rebellions.  Corrupt and incompetent daimyo 
threatened the stability of Tokugawa Japan as much as 
Christianity.  In order to avoid revolt and the resultant humiliation, 
daimyo were pressured to practice fair taxation and law. 
 Later daimyo would employ a number of methods for 
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quelling peasant dissent.  Some lords made concessions in order to 
appease the peasantry.  Dete Masamune in Sendai cleverly 
managed to both gain the peasantry’s support for his rule by 
reducing the tax rate while also gaining more control over the 
surplus agricultural production and maximum revenue by 
broadening the tax base.223  In Dete’s case, he avoided pushing the 
peasant population to desperation and his concessions in the tax 
rate kept the populace peaceful.  Simultaneously, he also increased 
his control and revenue from the agricultural farmland.  Other 
lords employed speakers like Hosoi Heishu to pacify their peasant 
populations.  In 1783, Hosoi was hired by the daimyo of Owari to 
mollify the peasantry, angered by poor living conditions worsened 
by a bout of famine.224  Hosoi’s allegorical sermon on the filial 
promise of a young wife to her parents-in-law was intended to 
remind the peasantry of their own duties to their lords and prevent 
any plots of dissent or rebellion against the Owari daimyo.225  The 
sermon was widely popular and drew huge crowds.  In this 
manner, the daimyo were able to broadcast their messages of 
loyalty and moral behavior to a wide peasant population.  Dete’s 
manipulation of the tax base and Hosoi’s sermons illustrate how 
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daimyo after the Shimabara Rebellion worked to pacify their 
peasant populations while also gaining more control over them. 
 The Tokugawa shogunate strived for control over its 
population.  Especially in early years, with the tumultuous Warring 
States years still fresh in the national memory, the shogunate 
believed political domination and unflinching order as the only 
path to peace.  Arguably, the violent methods they employed to 
subdue the peasantry and their daimyo prevented the outbreak of 
an even more destructive and violent war between states.  Driving 
a wedge between the Christians and the rest of Japan, they took 
away the ability for Christianity to become a rallying cry for 
peasant revolt.  Communities would remain divided by “fear of thy 
neighbor,” and could not organize easily or harmoniously.  
Furthermore, the rise of the Zen Buddhist temples as the religious 
arm of the Tokugawa gave them tighter control over the personal 
spiritual lives of its subjects. 226   Soto Zen temples monitored 
parishioners in order to prohibit other religions independent of 
Tokugawa control, especially Christianity and the Nichiren Fuju 
Fuse.227  These temples, much like the constant codes of conduct, 
would advocate for appropriate behavior, knowing one’s place in 
the social hierarchy, and submission to the daimyo and shogunate.  
By demonstrating the penalty for failure, daimyo were pressured to 
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minimize corruption and punishment in their domain, or to at least 
formulate methods for placating or subduing the local population.  
Bearable taxation and living conditions deterred many peasants 
from resorting to open rebellion.  The Tokugawa goal was to take 
away both the cause and means of peasant rebellion, in order to 
maintain peace in the realm. 
  Ohashi explored how memory and historical analysis 
influenced the evolving narrative of the Shimabara Rebellion.  In 
early-modern Japan, Christian heresy and disruptive European 
influences were emphasized and the despotism of the Shimabara 
and Amakusa lords was placed in the background. 228   This 
narrative justified, at least in their own eyes, Tokugawa 
shogunate’s harsh persecution of Japanese Christians and their 
expulsion of the Europeans.  As a result, the Christian uprising 
narrative dominated the early Japanese historical accounts and, 
subsequently, the early European historians who used their work.  
However, in later research, more historians recognized how the 
Rebellion also demonstrated a struggle between peasants and lords, 
on the grounds of political terrorism and economic oppression.  
Ohashi contended that later historians focused more on social and 
economic histories, though perhaps too narrowly.229  Though they 
had uncovered another driving cause for the Rebellion, they only 
reordered the causes to place unbearable taxation and punishment 
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as the primary cause and Christianity as a secondary.  In order to 
accurately understand the Shimabara Rebellion, Ohashi asserted 
historians must stop resorting to an “either-or” binary debate.230  
Instead of contesting which cause had more influence, historians 
should attempt to uncover the relationships between Christian 
persecution and economic oppression and how they compounded 
to explode into the Rebellion. 
 The Shimabara Rebellion occurred within a tradition of 
socially cohesive groups of peasants resisting domination by their 
lord.  Influenced by resentment over religious persecution, outrage 
over harsh punishments from the daimyo, and unbearable taxation, 
the Rebellion was a desperate act by a peasantry left with few other 
options to survive.  Due to the strong communal ties between the 
Kyushu peasantry, which included a substantial Japanese Christian 
population, the Rebellion survived for four months and drove the 
lords of Shimabara and Amakusa to humiliation and seppuku.  The 
Tokugawa shogunate’s response shows how these influences were 
all vital to the Rebellion’s success, by trying to remove all these 
factors, including Christianity, the local cultural alliances, and the 
provocative corruption of incompetent daimyo.  Instead of trying 
to simplify the Shimabara Rebellion into a single-storied narrative, 
historians must allow the Rebellion to exist as a complicated 
historical event. 
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"Under the Auspices of Peace": 
The Northwest Indian War and its Impact on 
the Early American Republic 
By 
Melanie L. Fernandes  
~      ~ 
 
 In April, 1789, George Washington was inaugurated as the 
first president of the United States of America.  Filled with pride 
for his new country and hope for its future, he spoke in his 
inaugural address about the prospects of the United States. 
Washington was clear that above all, the new government of the 
United States should do right by itself to preserve the nation and 
protect its citizens: 
 
In these honorable qualifications, I 
behold the surest pledges, that as on 
one side, no local prejudices, or 
attachments; no seperate [sic] views, 
nor party animosities, will misdirect 
the comprehensive and equal eye 
which ought to watch over this great 
assemblage of communities and 
interests: so, on another, that the 
foundations of our National policy 
will be laid in the pure and 
immutable principles of private 
morality; and the pre-eminence of a 
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free Government, be exemplified by 
all the attributes which can win the 
affections of its Citizens, and 
command the respect of the world.231  
 
Washington wanted for no particular group's interests to dictate the 
government's policies, and he wanted to ensure that the 
government would always have the nation and its citizens' best 
interests in mind. For Washington, this was one means of working 
towards his main goal for the nation: that the United States as a 
new nation would "command the respect of the world."  
 In order to achieve this, Washington had numerous 
ambitious, but necessary, goals for the nation.  He wanted to 
reduce the national debt, establish a strong currency, and reopen 
trade and renew amiable relations with the British. In short, his 
goals all had to do with economic and national security, which he 
understood to be crucial to the protection and success of the nation. 
Washington and his contemporaries knew that proving the 
legitimacy of the United States to major European powers was 
extremely important during the early years of the republic, as this 
was when it was most vulnerable. Unfortunately for these men, the 
process of establishing the foundation of the United States was far 
more complicated than they would have hoped. Along with all the 
pressures of establishing order and an effective government, 
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managing the national debt from the Revolutionary War, and 
attempting to reconcile with Great Britain, the United States faced 
conflict with Indian tribes that threatened the entire success of the 
nation.  
 It is undeniable that the nation’s early success was largely 
tied to Indian relations. In some sense this was because 
Washington and other national leaders saw the nation’s success as 
contingent upon the opening of the Northwest Territory. The 
Treaty of Paris, which signified the official end of the American 
Revolution in 1783, extended the western border of the United 
States to the Mississippi River. The Continental Congress, the 
governing body from the Revolution until the establishment of the 
new federal government in 1789, planned to decrease national debt 
by selling this land to settlers on the western frontier.  
 However, the Native Americans living in this territory were 
not consulted when the Treaty of Paris was signed. Tension and 
animosity exploded as the United States attempted to assert their 
dominance on the lands that Native Americans still claimed. These 
tensions had years to build up between the end of the 
Revolutionary War and when Washington took office in 1789. 
However, until Washington's presidency the Continental Congress 
did not take Native American opinion into consideration when 
forming Indian policy. Continued violence marked the relationship 
between the frontier settlers and several western Native American 
tribes. As a result, Washington accepted his presidency just as 
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conflicts were reaching a climax. Frontiersmen demanded federal 
protection from the Indians; Indians refused to cede their lands, 
demanding that the borderline of the United States be moved back 
to its previous point at the Ohio River. Yet, with no regular army, 
minimal federal funds, and a government in its infancy, 
Washington was hardly in an optimal position to deal with this 
conflict. It was crucial that he deal with this issue effectively, as 
this was one of the first tests of the new nation's governing ability. 
 Washington was torn. While he wanted to come to a 
peaceful settlement with the dominant Northwestern Indian tribes, 
the Indians were not willing to make peace with the new 
Mississippi River land boundary and the United States was not 
willing to give up the Northwest Territory. Settlers were eager to 
move into the area, and Congress linked the progress of the nation 
to the acquisition of this territory. It seemed that Washington had 
no choice but to assert American authority and use force against 
the Indians. After all, simply conceding to them would make the 
United States federal government appear weak to Great Britain, the 
Indian tribes, and to the citizens of the United States. The federal 
government decided it would be in the United States' best interest 
to launch a military expedition to punish the aggressive Indian 
tribes. 
 The military campaigns sent by the United States to quell 
Indian hostilities in the Ohio country between 1790-1795 are 
collectively known as the Northwest Indian War. Historians have 
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noted this conflict as significant, and even critical, both in the 
course of Washington's presidency and the early development of 
the nation. However, there was no shortage of adversities for 
Washington to overcome as the first president of the United States, 
and the Northwest Indian War is often depicted as another issue on 
the list. Typically, this scholarship explores the Northwest Indian 
War in the context of overall Indian relations in the United States 
between 1785-1815. 232  Even Wiley Sword's President 
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 
1790-1795 spends relatively little time exploring the deeper 
implications that these events had on the development of the 
United States. 233  More recently, Colin Calloway and William 
Patrick Walsh have focused on the nation's response to this 
conflict, but neither considers its impact in defining federal powers 
over the West and the states.234 An examination of the papers of 
George Washington and his contemporaries indicates how they 
used the Northwest Indian War as an opportunity to strengthen the 
federal government. Native American relations and policy during 
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this period were instrumental in defining the roles and abilities of 
the federal government. In many ways, the Northwest Indian War 
gave the United States the opportunity to establish how the federal 
government would be viewed not just by its own citizens, but by 
dominant powers of the world.  
 
Securing Indian Lands 
 A great deal of conflict occurred between the end of the 
Revolutionary War in 1783 and the establishment of the new 
federal government in 1789. This conflict defined the 
circumstances leading ultimately to the Northwest Indian War. 
During these years the United States operated under the governing 
body of the Continental Congress, which was established in 1774. 
At this time Congress set the precedent for what the United States' 
Native American policy would be, and the events of this period 
directly affected the circumstances that surrounded Washington 
when he entered the presidency.  
 At the conclusion of the American Revolution, the United 
States and Britain both signed the Treaty of Paris to officially 
establish peace between them. As a concession of this treaty, 
Britain ceded the land known as the Northwest Territory to the 
United States; the United States' western boarder was extended to 
the Mississippi River, which Britain permitted the United States to 
utilize for trade. The treaty also required Britain to remove all its 
soldiers from any western 
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forts they occupied, but the British continued to hold the forts of 
Michilimackinac, Detroit, Niagra, Oswego, Oswegatchie, and 
several others for more than a decade after the treaty was signed.235 
This allowed them to protect their extensive western trade and 
thereby maintain influence with their Native American allies, 
especially as the United States pushed into western territory.236 
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The British presence in the Northwest Territory would be 
problematic for the United States in the years to come. 
 After the Treaty of Paris, treaty commissioners from the 
United States told the Indians living in the Northwest Territory that 
they were a conquered people, and as such were not entitled to live 
in the Northwest Territory. The Indians felt betrayed and 
abandoned by the British, who had not consulted them about the 
Treaty of Paris land cessions and left them to reconcile with the 
Americans on their own. The American federal government 
proceeded to develop their Indian policy around the assumption 
that the United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest 
Territory. 237  The implementation of this policy resulted in the 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Treaty of McIntosh, and the Treaty of Fort 
Finney. The United States used these three treaties to secure land 
from the Indians in the Northwest Territory. With each of these 
treaties, the United States commissioners indicated that they 
wanted to make peace with the Native Americans. However, when 
the Native American tribes arrived at the treaty meetings they 
found that the commissioners had little intention of actually 
negotiating with them.  
 In 1784, the United States made the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 
with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. The Iroquois arrived at Fort 
Stanwix in New York in October ready to discuss terms of peace. 
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Instead, the congressional commissioners read them the terms of 
the Treaty of Paris and they asked the Indians to choose a 
boundary line between United States and Indian land.238 As some 
of the Iroquois tribes had been allied with the British during the 
Revolutionary War, the commissioners felt justified in dominating 
the treaty-making process. Cornplanter, a leader of the Seneca 
nation, acted as a spokesman and proposed to uphold the Ohio 
River boundary that had been established in a former treaty, the 
1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Cornplanter explained that the 
traditional role of the Six Nations was to speak on behalf of the 
other western tribes and such a boundary would be in the best 
interest of all the western Indian tribes.239 However, this boundary 
would have cut the United States off from much of the Northwest 
Territory. The commissioners told the Iroquois that they had no 
right to propose such a conservative boundary, as the United States 
was now the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory. They 
then offered the Iroquois an ultimatum: give up their land claims in 
the Northwest Territory, or face war with the United States.240  
 The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix ultimately caused a divide 
in the Iroquois nations. With each nation on different standing with 
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the United States it was difficult for the Six Nations to remain 
firmly unified and their confederacy began to deteriorate. Thus, the 
dominance of the Iroquois declined among the western Indians. As 
Cornplanter indicated in the treaty deliberations, the Iroquois had 
traditionally been a dominant force in the intertribal dynamic of the 
Northwest Territory. This gave way for the Shawnee and Miami, 
two tribes affected by a later treaty, to become more dominant 
powers in the west.241  
 The Americans enacted a second peace treaty, known as the 
Treaty of Fort McIntosh, with the Delaware and Wyandot tribes. 
The signing of this treaty took place thirty miles northwest of 
Pittsburgh in January, 1785. As with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 
the commissioners threatened war if these Indian tribes did not 
give up their lands and agree to live on designated United States 
reservations in the northern part of Ohio.242 The last of these three 
treaties was made with the Shawnee, Miami, Potawatomi, and 
various Wabash tribes. Known as the Treaty of Fort Finney, or the 
Treaty at the Mouth of the Great Miami, it took place at the 
convergence of the Miami and Ohio Rivers in January, 1786. It 
restricted the Shawnee to a reservation next to the designated 
Delaware and Wyandot reservations in the northern corner of Ohio 
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and Indiana.243 Aware of the results of the Treaties of Fort Stanwix 
and Fort McIntosh, the Indians put up significant resistance at Fort 
Finney. The Miami outright refused to comply with the terms of 
the treaty and many of the Shawnee were strongly opposed to it as 
well. Apprehensive about making war with the Americans, 
however, resentful Shawnee leaders finally agreed to sign the 
treaty.  
 It was fortunate for the United States that all of the tribes 
they treated with agreed to their terms, for the United States did 
not have the military or monetary means necessary to go to war 
with the Native Americans. In fact, Congress' lack of funds was 
one of the major reasons that the United States vied for complete 
control of the Northwest Territory in the first place. At the end of 
the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress was about $40 
million in debt.244 Under the Articles of Confederation, the United 
States' first constitutional document, the government did not have 
the ability to impose taxes on the American people. As such, the 
acquisition of funds was crucial for the federal government. By 
obtaining the Northwest Territory, the federal government could 
sell tracts of land to settlers and maintain profitable trade by 
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having access to the Mississippi River.245 Additionally, without the 
money to fund an army to remove the Indians, the federal 
government would not be able to make good on their threats to go 
to war with the Indians, and needed to entice them to leave through 
peaceful means. United States Native American policy was 
entirely driven by the notion that securing peace with the Indians 
would be the easiest and cheapest way of acquiring the Northwest 
Territory.246 
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Hostilities on the Frontier and the Miami Confederacy 
 Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Finney, 
violence emerged on the frontier. It became clear just how 
dissatisfied the Indians were with the treaty settlements. Henry 
Knox, Secretary of War under the Continental Congress and during 
Washington's presidency, was responsible for handling Indian 
affairs. In 1786, Revolutionary War veteran General Josiah Harmar 
wrote Knox to update him on the conditions in the Northwest 
Territory. In his letter, Harmar explained to Knox that land 
surveyors were eager to go out into the Northwest Territory and 
were requesting escorts from Harmar. Because settlers were 
already being attacked, Harmar feared that armed escorts would 
bring out more hostilities from the angered Indians: "The murders 
that have been committed lately upon the inhabitants passing up 
and down the Ohio, indicate great dissatisfaction prevailing 
amongst the Indians."247 
 In the end months of 1786, various Indian tribes organized 
a council in Sandusky, Ohio to discuss their dissatisfaction with 
the treaties made with them and relations with the United States. 
The Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Miami, 
Potawatomi, Cherokee, Six Nations, and members of the Wabash 
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Confederacy were all present. 248  As each tribe had varying 
experiences with the United States, there was some inconsistency 
among their views. Some tribes, like the Delaware, Wyandot, and 
the Seneca of the Six Nations were willing to promote amiable 
relations with the United States. Joseph Brant, leader of the 
Mohawk of the Six Nations, was not willing to settle for the 
provisions made for his tribe in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, but was 
inclined to seek assistance in acquiring new land from the British 
in Canada rather than engage in war with the Americans. On the 
other hand, the Shawnee, Miami, and members of the Wabash 
Confederacy were adamant about fighting to protect their lands 
from the Americans.249 These tribes, along with several Iroquois 
tribes, the Ojibwa, the Ottawa, and the Potawatomi, formed the 
Miami Confederacy, or the Northwest Confederacy.250 The Miami 
Confederacy, which was united loosely under the leadership of 
Miami warrior chief Little Turtle, formed with the common 
purpose of preventing the United States from taking any lands past 
the Ohio River.251  
 Amidst these growing tensions, the United States drafted 
the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. The purpose of the Northwest 
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Ordinance was to dictate how the Northwest Territory might be 
organized and inducted into the United States. However, since the 
federal government was aware of Indian grievances, the Northwest 
Ordinance also affirmed that the United States would respect 
Indian rights in regards to assuming Indian lands. The ordinance 
dictated that the Northwest Territory be divided into no less than 
three and no more than five states. Once a piece of territory 
accumulated at least 60,000 free inhabitants the government would 
admit it into the United States on equal status with all other 
states.252  
 The ordinance also specifically stated that the "utmost good 
faith shall always be observed towards the Indians" and that "their 
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their 
consent." 253  While historians such as Reginald Horsman have 
asserted that the language of the Northwest Ordinance indicated a 
shift in Indian policy at this time, the federal government's 
subsequent actions do not reflect the language of the Ordinance, 
and it seems that there was little shift in Native American policy 
during this period. The Ordinance indicated willingness to 
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negotiate with the Indians. However, rather than negotiate with the 
Indians, the federal government's simply tried to pay for the land 
that they previously asserted was conquered territory. While this 
change in technique certainly suggested a shift in attitude on the 
United States' part, their end goal of acquiring those lands by any 
means necessary remained the same.  
 Under the Northwest Ordinance, veteran of the American 
Revolution Arthur St. Clair became the governor of the Northwest 
Territory. Part of his initial instructions from Congress was to 
make treaties with the Indians should the situation require it. As 
hostilities had increased in recent months, it was clear that a treaty 
was necessary. St. Clair was directed to alleviate "all causes of 
controversy, so that peace and harmony may continue between the 
United States and the Indian tribes, the regulating trade, and 
settling boundaries." Congress authorized money specifically for 
the purpose of renewing a treaty with the Indians, hoping that 
compensation for the land would settle any animosity with the 
Indians. In order to protect United States interest out west, St. 
Clair's instructions further required him to maintain the statutes of 
the current treaties, "unless a change of boundary beneficial to the 
United States can be obtained." Such specifications indicated that 
the United States was not actually willing to negotiate with the 
Indians, but rather wanted to reaffirm their former treaties.254 The 
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United States' actions therefore did not necessarily match the 
language of their policies, and their treatment of the Indians 
remained essentially the same. Although members of the federal 
government may have thought that they were being more 
conciliatory in offering monetary compensation for the lands they 
assumed, the issue for the Indians was not just in the lack of 
compensation. Rather, the Indians were upset that the federal 
government assumed it had any right to their lands at all. The 
government's offer to pay for the lands actually did little to 
alleviate any animosity. 
 St. Clair met with delegates from the Six Nations, 
Delaware, Wyandot, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi in 
December, 1788. Though invited, the aggravated Shawnee and 
Miami tribes refused to negotiate land cession with the United 
States and refused to participate in this treaty council.255 What the 
Indians desired out of this new treaty was a change in the land 
boundary back to the Ohio River.256 St. Clair refused, saying that 
the British had ceded these lands to the United States and that the 
boundaries had been fixed by the Treaties of Fort Stanwix, Fort 
McIntosh, and Fort Finney. St. Clair concluded deliberations with 
the Indians by saying that the United States greatly desired peace 
with the Indians, but would go to war with them if necessary.257 
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Although this treaty council offered the Indians another chance to 
speak their piece, St. Clair still offered the same ultimatum. 
Backed into a corner once more, these Indian tribes hesitantly 
agreed. In January of 1789, St. Clair signed two treaties, together 
known as the Treaty of Fort Harmar: one with the Six Nations, and 
one with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and 
Potawatomi. Though this treaty was another attempt by the United 
States to secure peace, it did nothing advantageous for either party. 
Rather, it simply served to reaffirm previous United States treaties 
and further anger the western Indian tribes. 
 
Washington as President 
 As the Miami Confederacy become more organized and 
aggravated by the new treaties, aggressions on the frontier 
continued to escalate. When Washington entered the presidency in 
1789, the hostilities seemed to be at their peak. Indian relations 
were one of Washington's top priorities when he entered the 
presidency. His aim was to find a way to make peace with the 
Indians so that American citizens could begin to settle the 
Northwest Territory without fear of conflict.  
 Washington's military career during the mid 1700s gave 
him experience with Indians. As such, he was regarded as 
somewhat of an Indian expert in the years leading up to his 
presidency. Washington had always advocated that maintaining 
peace with the Indians was crucial if the United States wanted to 
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settle the Northwest Territory. He believed that military action 
should only be taken against the Indians as a last resort, as 
purchasing Indian lands would be both cheaper and involve less 
bloodshed. 258  Washington took this policy with him into his 
presidency, and with violence at its peak, he developed several 
initiatives to help secure peace with the Indians. Secretary of War 
Knox was perhaps the most influential man in regards to Indian 
policy during Washington's presidency. Washington and Knox 
worked well together developing these policies, as they were 
generally in agreement about how to handle Indian affairs. Both 
Washington and Knox agreed that all measures should be taken to 
promote peace and make treaties with the Indians rather than 
engage in war. They believed it would be morally wrong to force 
the Indians off their land without just cause. Knox had a 
particularly sympathetic view towards the Indians. In a letter to 
Washington, Knox expressed a desire protect Indian interests, as 
the Indians were the "prior occupants" of the land, and as such 
"possess[ed] the right of the Soil" in the Northwest Territory. He 
was adamant that these lands "cannot be taken from them unless by 
their free consent, or by the right of a just War…" To do otherwise 
"would be a gross violation of the fundamental Laws of Nature and 
of that destributive [sic] justice which is the glory of a nation."259  
 Knox, like Washington, saw great potential for the nation 
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in possession of the Northwest Territory. However, he believed 
that there was little need to use force to acquire vast amounts of 
land from the Indians: "As the settlements of the whites shall 
approach near to the indian boundaries established by treaties, the 
game will be diminished and the lands being valuable to the 
indians only as hunting grounds, they will be willing to sell further 
tracts for small considerations…" As their resources were 
gradually depleted, Knox continued, the Indian populations would 
decrease, "enabl[ing] the Union to operate against them [in battle] 
with much greater prospect than at present." 260  Knox therefore 
asserted that making peace with the Indians was in the best interest 
of all, as going to war with them would hardly be worthwhile when 
the United States would likely be able to acquire more lands from 
them in the coming years. 
 In general, Washington's Indian policies involved 
strengthening the power of the federal government so that it could 
better handle Indian relations. One of Washington's main goals 
was to make sure that the federal government, not individual states, 
was in charge of handling all Indian relations and treaties. In a 
letter to Washington July, 1789, Knox confirmed his agreement 
that the "general Sovereignty must possess the right of making all 
treaties on the execution of violation of which depend peace or 
war." 261  Given the recent rise in hostilities on the frontier, 
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Washington saw the demonstration of federal authority in Indian 
affairs as crucial. In his mind, centralization of federal power 
would enable the government to hold Indians and American 
citizens accountable for any violence they caused, thereby 
discouraging them from engaging in further hostilities. 
 There were, however, significant set-backs in Washington's 
efforts to ensure peace by promoting Indian confidence in the 
federal government. The federal government's failure to 
immediately engage in military combat with the Indians caused the 
citizens on the frontier to lose faith in the federal government's 
ability to protect them. They therefore implemented their own kind 
of punishment against the Indians, continuing more localized 
aggressions towards Indians. This in turn made the Indians 
question the federal government's sincerity and ability to uphold 
their promises of holding the frontiersmen responsible for killing 
Indians. Unfortunately, many of the victimized tribes were not 
actively hostile towards the United States. The Miami and 
Shawnee, two more western-based tribes, were particularly hostile 
towards citizens on the frontier, but angry frontiersmen generally 
attacked Indians indiscriminately. Governor St. Clair wrote 
Washington in September, 1789 explaining the situation: "It is not 
to be expected, sir, that the Kentucky people will or can submit 
patiently to the cruelties and depredations of those savages; they 
are in the habit of retaliation, perhaps, without attending precisely 
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to the nations from which the injuries are received…"262 Thus, the 
hostilities on the frontier not only aggravated already existing 
animosity with the Indians, but also threatened the peaceful 
relations that the United States had managed to secure with more 
eastern-based tribes such as the Seneca.  
 While Washington and Knox both wanted to secure peace, 
neither was willing to compromise the overall well-being of the 
nation or the protection of its citizens. Washington had instructed 
St. Clair to use military force on the frontier only as a last resort, 
but by 1790, it was becoming increasingly clear that a last resort 
might be necessary to subdue the Indians. 263  In a "Summary 
Statement of the Situation of the Frontiers by the Secretary of 
War" Knox explained that Josiah Harmar had given numerous 
accounts of the "depredations of the Indians on the boats going 
down the Ohio…" Knox noted the "bad effect [these hostilities 
had] on the public mind…The result of this whole information 
shows the inefficiency of defensive operations against the banditti 
Shawnese and Cherokees, and some of the Wabash Indians on the 
north-west of the Ohio." He therefore concluded that a military 
expedition to punish the Indians and defend the frontier was the 
right course of action.264 It was no secret that Washington wanted 
to build a stronger army when he entered the presidency. In his 
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first address to Congress in January of 1790, he formally proposed 
his goal of "of providing for the common defense." Washington 
was a firm believer that being "prepared for war is one of the most 
effectual means of preserving peace."265 He hoped that by building 
up the national army he could intimidate the Indians into agreeing 
to peace with the United States.266 
  
Harmar's Defeat 
 Still hoping for a peaceful outcome, Congress nevertheless 
agreed to Washington's plan of using the army to intimidate the 
Indians. In 1790, Congress authorized an expansion of the army. 
Led by Josiah Harmar, the new army would have one thousand 
regulars and fifteen hundred militiamen from the states of 
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 267  By late 1790, the 
increasing conflict on the frontier made it clear that the Indians 
were not going to be intimidated into making peace, and the United 
States government would have to use force against them. Referring 
back to the Northwest Ordinance, Washington and Congress 
viewed this military expedition as a "just and lawful war," in which 
they would swiftly punish the Indians for their destruction on the 
frontier. In Knox's orders to Harmar on June 7, 1790, Knox stated 
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that "No other remedy remains, but to extirpate, utterly, if possible, 
the [Indian] banditti."268 The plan was for Harmar to lead the main 
body of troops west from Fort Washington to attack Miami 
villages along the Maumee River, while Major John Hamtramck 
came from Fort Knox in the west with three hundred regulars and 
three hundred Kentucky militiamen.269 
 As the United States prepared for their military expedition, 
the federal government came to the agreement that the British 
should be made aware of their plans. Since the British had not 
actually left their western forts after the signing of the Treaty of 
Paris, the United States did not want the British to think the 
military expedition was aimed at pushing them out of the 
Northwest Territory and risk renewing hostilities with them. As 
such, Knox ordered St. Clair to contact the British commander at 
Detroit and explain that the expedition was purely for the purpose 
of punishing Indians who had been aggressive towards the United 
States.270  
 Although the British commander assured St. Clair that they 
were not concerned about this, they immediately notified British 
traders in Miami villages, who assisted the Indians by giving them 
supplies to prepare for an attack from the United States. When 
Harmar and his men reached the Miami villages in the middle of 
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October, they found them abandoned, as the Indians had been 
warned ahead of time. The army burned the villages regardless, 
thinking that if they could not punish the Indians directly, they 
could at least destroy their homes and supplies. Meanwhile, 
Harmar sent Colonel John Hardin and approximately three hundred 
men to pursue the fleeing Indians. Instead of a swift subjugation of 
the Indians, Hardin found an ambush waiting for him and his men. 
Taken by surprise, the men lost all organization and dispersed. The 
militiamen fled the scene completely, leaving the regulars to fend 
for themselves. After a brutal attack that left almost two hundred 
dead and several dozen wounded, the regulars retreated back to the 
rest of the army.271  
 Washington was extremely angered by this loss and blamed 
the defeat on Harmar's perceived deficiencies. In a letter to Knox, 
Washington accused Harmar of being both a drunkard and an 
ineffective leader: "I expected little from the moment I heard he 
was a drunkard. I expected less as soon as I heard that on this 
account no confidence was reposed to him by the people of the 
Western Country—And I gave up all hope of Success, as soon as I 
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heard that there were disputes with him about command." 272 
Despite Washington's fervor in his criticisms of Harmar, the 
responsibility of the defeat did not rest solely on Harmar's 
shoulders. In fact, most of Washington's assertions about Harmar's 
conduct were false. According to Washington biographer John 
Ferling, Washington was inclined to find scapegoats to blame 
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when situations under his command deteriorated.273 Harmar was 
certainly the easiest man to blame in this instance, and his 
reputation never fully recovered.  
 In truth, the failure of the expedition should be attributed to 
a myriad of factors, the most significant being the poor quality of 
the militia. The militia, comprised of ill-trained men not entirely fit 
for military work, made up the majority of the military force of this 
expedition. Their haste to abandon the battle as soon as they were 
under attack left the regulars severely outnumbered, which 
essentially forced them to retreat.274 Moreover, the entire force was 
significantly weakened when Harmar authorized his troops to 
separate into different groups. Only a small portion of the available 
men were actually present during the Indian attack, as the rest had 
remained to burn the villages.275 In the planning of this expedition, 
Congress specifically authorized the recruitment of more men so 
that Harmar would be prepared should the Indians have managed 
to accrue a strong force of warriors against them. Regardless of the 
reasoning behind Harmar's failure, hostilities on the frontier 
increased as a result of this direct attack on the Indians. Fear 
among frontier settlers was rising, and they demanded that the 
federal government act to protect them. The federal government 
hastily began plans for a new military expedition. 
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St. Clair's Defeat 
 Washington and Congress knew that they had to deal with 
the Indian problem immediately. Many Americans had not 
believed the Indians capable of raising a force able to defeat an 
organized American army. The results of the expedition proved 
otherwise and frontier settlers began to panic that they would be 
the victims of a mass Indian attack. Knox and Washington quickly 
set about planning for a second expedition. They appealed to 
Congress for an expansion of the army to three thousand men. This 
time they called for twelve hundred regulars, thirteen hundred 
volunteer levies, and five hundred rangers. 276  It was not too 
difficult for Washington and Knox to convince Congress that such 
an expansion was necessary, as both Harmar and Washington's 
administration had blamed the failure of the expedition at least 
partly on the inadequacy of the militia.  
 Harmar's failed expedition had threatened the federal 
government's reputation—it was now in jeopardy of being seen as 
incapable of protecting its citizens and ineffective in handling 
disputes. Yet, in some sense Harmar's defeat was advantageous to 
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Washington, as it enabled him to set the foundation for a 
reformation of the militia system. Washington's contemporaries 
had known his distaste for the militia since the Revolutionary War, 
and many had expected him to appeal for the creation of a large 
national army when he came into office. Although Washington 
avoided aligning with any particular political faction, like many of 
his Federalist contemporaries he desired a strong standing army to 
protect the nation and demonstrate the power of the federal 
government. However, Washington was aware of political tensions 
between the emerging Federalist and Democratic-Republican 
political parties. He did not want party alliances to divide the 
nation, and he avoided aligning with either party, despite his 
agreement with certain Federalist views. He knew that pushing for 
a standing army upon his entrance into the presidency would be 
viewed unfavorably by many citizens. Many Americans associated 
standing armies with martial law from their experiences with the 
presence of the British army during the Revolution.277  
 Washington hoped that by using more regulars and 
volunteers the army would be an adequately trained force to 
accomplish the goal of subduing the Indians. Unlike militiamen, 
regulars and volunteers were required to submit to traditional 
military discipline. These men would not only be better trained, but 
also act more professionally in the face of battle.278 Washington 
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appointed St. Clair as major general of this new army, hoping that 
he would prove a better leader than Harmar.  
 St. Claire's plan was to leave Philadelphia in March, 1791, 
lead his army to Fort Washington in order to meet Kentucky 
militiamen, and then proceed with the attack in the Wabash Valley. 
However, St. Clair left Philadelphia later than planned and faced 
additional unforeseen delays, as he had difficulty acquiring 
sufficient numbers of men and adequate supplies. St. Clair did not 
reach Fort Washington until the middle of May, and even then not 
all the militia had arrived from other states. The troops were not 
fully convened until September, at which point it was late in the 
season to be embarking on a military expedition as they risked 
suffering through the winter months.279 St. Clair, however, assured 
Knox in a letter on September 18, 1791 "that every possible 
exertion shall be made to bring the campaign to a speedy and 
happy issue."280 Despite the delays St. Clair felt secure his ability 
to lead a successful expedition. He was certain of the superior 
military ability of the United States army. He felt, as did Knox and 
many of his other contemporaries, sure that the disjointed war 
tactics of the Indians would be no match for his disciplined army, 
even if the Indians managed to outnumber them.281 
 St. Clair should have not have so greatly underestimated his 
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opponents; he and his men expected the Indians to be severely 
disorganized. But what they did not know was that the Indians, led 
by the Miami and Shawnee tribes, had gone to Detroit after the 
incident with Harmar to request assistance from the British. Blue 
Jacket, one of the Shawnee leaders, appealed to the British saying 
the United States had plans to take all their lands: "as a People we 
are determined to meet the approaches of an Enemy, who came not 
to check the Insolence of individuals, but with a premeditated 
design to root us out of our Land, which we and our forefathers 
and children were and are bound to defend, and which we are 
determined to do."282 The commanding officers in Detroit told the 
Indians that they could offer no troops to support them, as they 
would risk getting into conflict with the United States. They did, 
however, offer the Indians supplies they needed to take on the 
American troops.  
 Not only were the Indians able to obtain British support, 
but they also managed to become much more organized than St. 
Clair, Knox, or Washington could have anticipated. Harmar's 
expedition had confirmed the fears of Indian tribes in the Wabash 
that the United States had the intention of usurping all western 
Indian lands. Other tribes, such as the Kickapoo, Wea, and 
Piankeshaw, who had been on the fence about combating the 
Americans were now convinced of American intentions and came 
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to the aid of the Miami and the Shawnee.283 The desperate fear of 
losing their lands banned these tribes together. Having caught wind 
of the American army's plans, they made their way to the Miami 
villages to prepare to ambush the American army. 
 On November 4, 1791 as St. Clair and his men finally made 
their way to the Miami villages, they were met with a full-blown 
Indian attack.284 The Indians completely surrounded the American 
army with organization that blindsided St. Clair and overwhelmed 
his men. The Indians used their traditional style of warfare and 
their knowledge of European war tactics to their advantage. The 
Indians were used to fighting as individuals, and they swiftly 
overtook American soldiers. They specifically targeted military 
officers, as they knew that without leadership the American 
soldiers would be completely disoriented and unable to fight as a 
unit.285 Those who survived the attack retreated to Fort Jefferson 
on St. Clair's orders. The losses were devastating. Thirty-seven 
officers and nearly six hundred enlisted men were killed, while 
thirty-two officers and approximately two-hundred and fifty men 
were wounded.286  
 On November 9, after St. Clair and his men had made it 
back to Fort Washington, St. Clair wrote Knox to tell him of the 
terrible loss. Washington was furious about the results of this 
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second campaign. He was now in a difficult position and faced a 
great deal of criticism. How could he explain how the military 
expedition had failed a second time? While he was able to blame 
the incompetency of Harmar for the failure of the first expedition, 
he knew he could not blame St. Clair this time, as it would only 
show that he was unable to provide a capable general for this 
task.287 Similarly, the militia could not be solely to blame, as much 
of the militia of the last expedition had been replaced by regulars 
for St. Clair's expedition.288 Washington had to report to Congress 
news of the defeat, and a special committee was developed to 
investigate what led to the loss of the expedition. 
 As the committee sought to get to the bottom of the matter, 
newspapers such as the New York Journal & Patriotic Register, 
Columbian Centinel, Connecticut Courant, and Maryland Gazette 
all published accounts of St. Clair's Defeat, which stirred up a 
variety of public opinions. 289  A typical reaction to St. Clair's 
Defeat was a desire for revenge on the murderous Indians. A 
Kentucky resident wrote to a friend in Philadelphia, “The news of 
the defeat of the troops under Gov. St. Clair by the Indians, so far 
from disheartening has filled every man in Kentucky with a thirst 
for revenge.”290  
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 Some members of the public were angered that the United 
States had attempted such an incursion in the first place, and felt 
that the United States was causing unnecessary problems with the 
Indians: "Are we not already in possession of more lands than can 
be settled for a century at least? … What better right have we to 
march through the centre of their country, than Great-Britain 
would have to march a body of troops through the centre of the 
United States?"291 In speaking so vehemently against the Indian 
expeditions, this writer, under the pseudonym "Anti-Pizaro," 
accused the federal government of impeding on the rights of the 
Indians to acquire more lands. He also raised questions about the 
real motivations for such an excursion: "Is it to conquer more 
lands, or to serve as a pretence for augmenting the standing 
army?" 292  The public was clearly questioning the government's 
Indian policies and motivations in the Indian war. Many worried 
that it was part of a Federalist ploy to give the government more 
power.  
 Another segment, this time appearing in the National 
Gazette, seconded that sentiment: 
 
The principles of the war it is hoped, 
will be thoroughly investigated, that 
the revenues of the States should not 
be wantonly expended in disgraceful 
campaigns. Americans having just 
                                                          
291 Boston Gazette, January 2, 1792. 
292 Boston Gazette, January 2, 1792. 
169 
 
freed themselves from an expensive 
war, it is our interest to promote 
friendship and harmony with all the 
world, and not to sacrifice our young 
men and our money, to acquire 
territory by war, while so much land 
remains unsettled, and which courts 
our cultivation under the auspices of 
peace.293 
 
This author stated that the federal government's reckless ambitions 
to secure the Northwest Territory were a waste of both men and 
money. Moreover, he implied that engaging in an unnecessary war 
to acquire lands painted the United States in a negative light to 
other nations, making the United States seem greedy and 
uncompromising. 
 Yet, there was also a portion of the public who supported 
Washington and his Native American policies. Rather than 
asserting that the United States had selfish and unjust motives in 
sending soldiers into the Northwest Territory, these citizens 
defended Washington and the federal government, assuring readers 
that Washington had been forced into taking military action in 
order to protect the nation. In one article posted in the Connecticut 
Gazette gave an explanation of how treaties were attempted with 
the hostile Wabash Indians, but they declined the offer and 
continued their hostilities: "The campaign, therefore, of the last 
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Figure 4 
St. Clair's Defeat Battle Map in Colin G. Calloway, The 
Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of 
the First American Army (New York: Oxford University 
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and this year, were measures of necessity—The Indians had been 
invading our frontiers, and had killed many hundred innocent men, 
women and children..."294 Citizens of this opinion were grateful 
that the government had taken action to protect them.  
 These inconsistent views about the Northwest Indian War 
are representative of the larger national debate at this time. Party 
alliances were becoming increasingly distinct, which resulted in 
starkly contrasting views about what the roles and responsibilities 
of the federal government should be. The special committee 
focused on many of these issues in their investigation of St. Clair's 
Defeat, questioning the amount of authority the federal 
government should have and what the responsibilities of elected 
officials were. Ultimately St. Clair was pardoned from any 
responsibility for the defeat. Congress and other elected officials 
were blamed for the delay in securing adequate funds for the 
expedition. Although it was not overtly stated, Washington and 
Knox also received a great deal of blame, as they had given the 
orders for St. Clair's campaign.295 St. Clair's Defeat had brought on 
a great deal of criticism of the federal government. 
 
Assertion of Federal Power and Wayne's Campaign 
 It was clear at this point that there was a divide within the 
United States about whether this Indian war should have taken 
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place at all. Many people were questioning the moral validity of 
the war as well as the creation of an army to deal with the issue. 
The political divide between Democratic-Republicans and 
Federalists became much more distinct as Congress and 
Washington's administration debated what course of action to 
take. 296  The Democratic-Republicans thought that the federal 
government was out of its depth and abusing its power to take over 
the Northwest Territory, while the Federalists tended to support the 
power of the federal government. Throughout the debate 
Washington maintained that the federal government needed to be 
consistent and continue its aims to take control of the Northwest 
Territory.297 Now more than ever he felt it was essential to the 
federal government's reputation that they succeed. 
 Congress tended to agree with Washington. After two 
failed expeditions, it would make the United States appear weak to 
simply give up. The federal government sincerely needed to prove 
its capability to its citizens. However, America's armed forces 
desperately needed to be salvaged after St. Clair's defeat and 
Congress feared that the frontier would experience the full extent 
of Indian wrath while they were trying to rebuild the army. 298 
Therefore, while Washington and Knox worked on a plan for the 
new army, Congress authorized peace commissioners to meet with 
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the Indians early in 1792. The Shawnee and Miami attended the 
meeting, along with several of the tribes that allied with them. The 
Shawnee and Miami also managed to convince the Six Nations to 
negotiate as well, although they had minimal involvement with the 
Northwest Indian War. 
 It is unlikely that the federal government actually expected 
peace to come out of this meeting. Although it certainly would 
have been optimal for the United States for the Indians to concede 
to give up their lands peacefully, no one believed that to be a 
realistic outcome. British lieutenant governor of Upper Canada 
John Graves Simcoe indicated that he believed that the Indians and 
Americans commissioners had met for the same reason: not 
actually to secure peace, but to procrastinate. In fact, he believed 
that the meeting was only a way for both sides to be assured in 
their missions: for the Americans, that the Indians needed to be 
destroyed; for the Indians, that the United States must be stopped 
in their efforts to take Indians lands.299  
 The peace talk went exactly as expected: neither side was 
willing to compromise. The American commissioners attempted to 
assure the Indians that they wanted to make peace with them, while 
the Indians declared to the commissioners that if the United States 
did not abide by the Ohio River boundary line, there could be no 
peace. The commissioners held firm, saying that as the Indians' 
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land had been ceded in the Treaty of Paris. The Indians responded 
that they had never agreed to give possession of their lands to the 
king of England, so it was not his land to cede to the United 
States.300 The Indians then declared that they would not leave the 
lands that were rightfully theirs. The American commissioners 
then resolved to return home, unable to make peace once more. 
 Meanwhile, Washington and Knox had been hard at work 
reforming the United States army. Now that circumstances 
demanded an army for the protection of the nation, Washington 
was able to develop a large standing army and reform the militia 
system, as he and his Federalist contemporaries had always wanted 
to do. 301  Knox developed a proposal for a new army of five 
thousand men to be enlisted for three years. In his proposal, Knox 
asserted that use of the militia for situations such as this would not 
be sufficient: "while it is acknowledged that mounted militia may 
be very proper for sudden enterprises, of short duration, it is 
conceived that militia are utterly unsuitable to carry on and 
terminate the war in which we are engaged, with honor and 
success."302 Knox and Washington also reorganized the army from 
an infantry, cavalry, and artillery into four sublegions, each 
commanded by a brigadier general. Washington appointed General 
Anthony Wayne, another veteran of the Revolution, to command 
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this army. 
 As for reforming the militia, Congress passed two acts that 
changed militia regulations. The first gave the president the ability 
to call upon the state militias when the nation was in jeopardy. The 
second act required all capable free white men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five to enroll in the militia. Overall, these 
military reforms strengthened the power of the federal government, 
as they gave the government much more military authority. 
 With this new force under his command, General Wayne 
arrived at Fort Washington in May, 1793 and began to prepare for 
the expedition. From the beginning this campaign went much more 
smoothly than the others. By the end of December Wayne and his 
men had made their way to the site of St. Clair's Defeat, 
established Fort Greenville, and set themselves up to remain there 
for the winter.303 In June, the Indians attempted an attack on the 
fort, but were fought off by the American army. The Potawatomi, 
Ojibwa, and Ottawa tribes were discouraged by this unsuccessful 
attack and abandoned the rest of the Miami Confederacy, greatly 
reducing the military power of their union. The army under 
Wayne's command was far more prepared for frontier fighting than 
that of either St. Clair or Harmar. To further weaken the Indian 
forces, Wayne's plan was to target the Indian villages' food and 
supplies as he and his army made their way along the Auglaize 
                                                          
303 Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 148; Horsman, Expansion and 
American Indian Policy, 99. 
176 
 
River. By August, Wayne and his men held the center of the 
Miami Confederacy at the intersection of the Maumee and 
Auglaize Rivers.  
 On August 19, the Indians prepared to meet the American 
army. The battle that came to be known as the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers took place the following morning. When the battle 
occurred, it was clear the Indians were severely outnumbered. This 
time the American army's organization and discipline were more 
than adequate to take on the Indians. The Americans quickly 
overtook the Indians, who retreated and sought assistance from the 
British at Fort Miami. The British, despite their previous 
assistance, were now engaged in the French Revolution in Europe 
and unwilling to risk conflict with the Americans. They refused to 
help the Indians, leaving them to fend for themselves. 304 Thus, 
Wayne's army was easily able to overtake the retreating Indians. 
The Battle of Fallen Timbers was, finally, an American victory. 
 In December of 1794, Wayne met with the Indian tribes to 
discuss peace. They agreed to meet in June of 1795 at Greenville 
to set a formal treaty.305 That summer, the Indians officially signed 
the Treaty of Greenville that waived their rights to two-thirds of 
Ohio and some smaller pieces of land in Indiana. Leaders of the 
Shawnee, Wyandot, Ottawa, and Delaware all signed the 
document. The Northwest Indian War was finally over and the 
                                                          
304 Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 150. 
305 Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 99. 
177 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 5 
Wayne's Campaign, July-Aug., 1790 in Wiley Sword, President 
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 
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federal government had demonstrated its authority. To uphold 
authority in the Northwest Territory, the federal government 
maintained a military presence on the frontier to supply forts that 
protected western trade.306 Around the same time, in November, 
1794, United States delegate John Jay successfully negotiated a 
treaty with Britain. Jay's Treaty, as it was known, required Britain 
to finally relinquish its posts on the frontiers. With both treaties 
secured, the Americans finally had complete access to the 
Northwest Territory.  
 
Conclusion 
 What Washington and the United States federal 
government failed to realize was that from the moment the Treaty 
of Paris was signed, conflict with the Indians was inevitable.  So 
long as Indian policy operated under the assumption that the 
United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory, 
Indian tribes were going to resist. The Indians had never 
recognized Great Britain as the previous sovereign power in the 
Northwest Territory, and thus felt the United States had no valid 
claim to the lands, especially since the Indians had no desire to 
give up those lands. The federal government wanted the 
impossible: they wanted the lands in the Northwest Territory and 
they wanted them peacefully. Their unwillingness to compromise 
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any of the lands in the Northwest Territory combined with their 
lack of respect for Indian rights to those lands set up explosive 
tensions that no amount of peace treaties could alleviate. 
 When Washington entered the presidency, his plan to 
secure peace with the Indians revolved around the strengthening of 
the federal government. Mainly, he wanted both the Indians and 
the individual states to recognize the federal government as the 
authority on Indian affairs, and to strengthen the United States' 
military force in order to enforce the federal government's power. 
As violence escalated on the frontier, the demands of citizens for 
protection from the federal government erupted. However, the new 
nation’s fragile state meant the federal government had little 
military power or funds to accomplish this. Two failed military 
expeditions against the Indians resulted in a federal reform of the 
army and militia system, significantly strengthening the power of 
the federal government. Without the violence of the Northwest 
Indian War, the demands for protection from United States citizens 
would not have driven Congress to make such federal reforms.  
 In this way, the events of the Northwest Indian War 
ultimately contributed to determining the role of the federal 
government in the early republic. With their demands for 
protection, American citizens on the frontier inadvertently 
conceded to a more centralized, more powerful government. Much 
to the chagrin of many of these citizens, the desire for a 
government that had the strength to protect them also created a 
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government with a capable force to use against them. When the 
Whiskey Rebellion erupted in Western Pennsylvania, Washington 
was able to quell the violent insurrection by calling upon the state 
militias in July, 1794. Such a use of force served to illustrate the 
newfound capabilities of the federal government to enforce their 
laws and policies throughout the nation. 
 Congress was right in asserting that the fate of the nation 
was tied to the acquisition of the Northwest Territory; yet, it was 
tied in unforeseeable ways. Beyond economic security, the events 
of the Northwest Indian War enabled Washington to achieve some 
of  his goals for the nation. Washington secured a stronger, 
more centralized government by calling for consolation of Indian 
affairs under the federal government and the creation of a federal 
army to protect the nation. Doing so ultimately allowed the United 
State to finally achieve victory in the Northwest Indian War. These 
policies certainly sparked contention among both citizens and 
Indians, raising questions as to the validity and justification of the 
United States' actions during the Northwest Indian War, the 
morality of which continues to be debated. Nevertheless, such a 
victory proved to American citizens, Indians, and European powers 
looking on that the United States was not only a force to be 
reckoned with, but worthy of "the respect of the world."  
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